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Abstract
To date, over 84% of countries worldwide have renewable energy targets
(RET), requiring that a certain amount of electricity be produced from re-
newable sources by a target date. Despite the worldwide prevalence of these
policies, little research has been conducted on ex-ante RET policy analysis.
In an effort to move toward evidence-based policymaking, this thesis develops
computational models to assess the tradeoffs associated with alternatives for
both RET achievement and RET policy formulation, including the option of
creating renewable energy credit (REC) markets to facilitate meeting an RET
goal. A mixed integer linear program (MILP), a probabilistic cost prediction
model and a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) serve as the theoretical
bases for the RET alternative and policy formulation analyses. From these
models it was found, inter alia, that RET goals set too low run the risk of
creating technological lock-in and could inhibit achievement of higher goals;
probabilistic cost predictions give decision-makers essential risk information,
when cost estimation is an integral part of alternatives assessment; and though
REC markets may facilitate RET achievement, including REC markets in an
RET policy formulation may not result in the lowest possible greenhouse gas
emissions (GHG).
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Resumo
Atualmente mais de 84% dos países do mundo têm metas definidas para
quotas de produção de energia de fontes renováveis (renewable energy target
ou RET). Apesar da prevalência global destas políticas, pouca investigação tem
sido conduzida na área da análise ex ante de políticas de RET. Com o objetivo
de contribuir para uma formulação fundamentada destas políticas, esta tese
propõe modelos computacionais para avaliar os compromissos associados a di-
ferentes alternativas de cumprimento de metas e de formulação de políticas de
RET, incluindo a opção de criar mercados de créditos de energias renováveis
(renewable energy credit ou glsrec) para facilitar o cumprimento de metas de
RET. Um modelo de programação linear inteira mista (mixed integer linear
program ou MILP), um modelo probabilístico de previsão de custos, e um pro-
blema de complementaridade misto (mixed complementarity problem ou MCP),
constituem as bases teóricas para as análises de alternativas de cumprimento
de metas e de formulação de políticas de RET. Com recurso a esses mode-
los, mostra-se, inter alia, que metas de RET demasiado baixas podem criar
dependências tecnológicas (technological lock-in) e podem também impedir o
cumprimento de metas mais ambiciosas; que previsões probabilísticas de custos
disponibilizam aos decisores informação de risco essencial, quando a estimação
de custos é parte integrante da avaliação de alternativas; e que embora os mer-
cados de REC facilitem o cumprimento de metas de RET, a sua inclusão numa
política de RET poderá não conduzir ao nível mais baixo de emissões de gases
com efeito de estufa (greenhouse gas emissions ou GHG).
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Introduction
This thesis develops computational models to aid decision making in renewable energy
policy formation. The models developed in this work specifically focus on informing a policy
aimed toward initiating the transition to a low-carbon electricity grid, known as a Renewable
Energy Target (RET), or Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). An RET mandates that a
certain percentage of electricity be produced from renewable generation sources. Generally,
the models in this thesis address the three main alternatives to RET achievement: 1) direct
investment in renewable energy power generation, 2) investment in grid interconnection to
areas with greater renewable energy supply, and 3) Renewable Energy Credit (REC) markets,
aimed to facilitate RET achievement when an electricity firm/region cannot directly invest
in its own renewable energy.
It is recognized that the policy, legislation and formulation process is fundamentally
political, with special interest groups often able to influence policy language. This thesis
represents an attempt to ground the political discussion in technical facts, using structured,
methodological paradigms. The models developed aim to gain insights on the effects of
different RET policy formulations on society. Our analysis seeks to identify who is rendered
better-off under a certain policy, and who, if anyone, is left worse-off.
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1.1 Research questions
We put forth three research questions to address the issue of RET policy analysis:
1. Geographic Attribution of an RET. What are the economic, social and envi-
ronmental tradeoffs associated with different geographic attributions of an RET?
Does direct investment in renewable energy shift significantly from one location to
another? Are carbon emissions more efficiently reduced in a certain geographic attri-
bution? Does the cost of a policy fall onto one region more than another? (Chapter
2)
2. Probabilistic Cost Prediction of Submarine Power Cable Projects. It is hy-
pothesized that offshore wind power could significantly aide countries in achieving
renewable energy targets. Given the global projected growth in the submarine power
cable industry, what statistical learning model best predicts the probability distribution
of the cost of a subsea power cable project? (Chapter 3)
3. RET Achievement through REC Trading or Renewable Energy Investment.
Under what renewable energy target policy formulation does an REC market facilitate
RET achievement? Does the timing of target compliance significantly affect social
welfare? (Chapter 4)
1.2 Thesis overview
In Chapter 2, the geographic attribution of an RET is analyzed. The economic, environ-
mental and social impacts are assessed to generate insights on the associated tradeoffs. The
Azores Islands off the coast of Portugal are used as a case study for the model. We find
that a regional geographic attribution of the RET achieves the lowest cost, and yields the
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greatest reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, though renewable energy investment
is less distributed across islands.
In Chapter 3, we develop a probabilistic cost prediction model for submarine power
cables to aid decision-makers in government, academia and industry to more accurately as-
sess alternatives for RET achievement. The model we developed is globally applicable, from
offshore wind power to grid interconnection applications. The best performing statistical
learning model has slightly more predictive power than a simpler, linear econometric model.
The specific decision context will determine whether the additional precision of the statis-
tical learning model is worth the extra data-gathering effort. A case study illustrates that
incorporating the uncertainty associated with the cost prediction to calculate risk metrics
- value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR) - provides useful information to
the decision-maker about cost variability and extremes.
In Chapter 4, we adapt a complementarity model of the electricity market and power
system, and include an REC market. Eight different RET policy scenarios are defined, and
analyzed based on greatest renewable energy investment, lowest GHG emissions reductions
and largest increase in social surplus. It was found that, in a market where players have the
option to invest in renewable energy expansion and unlimited transmission capacity, an RET
policy design of multi-stage targets at the firm-level, without an REC market, is optimal.
This design not only achieves the highest social surplus, but also the highest renewable
investment and the greatest reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
Our three investigations provide considerable insights into RET policy analysis. Not only
do we analyze RET policy formulation ex ante, but we also conduct robust assessments of
alternative methods of achieving these targets. In the process, we both enhance existing
models (Research Question 1 and Research Question 3) and develop new ones (Research
Question 2).
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Chapter 2
Geographic Attribution of an
Electricity System Renewable Energy
Target:
Local Economic, Social and
Environmental Tradeoffs
The 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report asserts that invest-
ment in low-carbon electricity production will need to rise by several hundred billion dollars
annually, before 2030, in order to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
by 2100. In recognition of this urgent need to mitigate climate change, many governments
have already established policies to spur renewable energy investment in the electricity sec-
tor. One such policy measure is a renewable energy target (RET), which sets a target
percentage of electricity production to be generated from renewable sources by a specified
This chapter is based on Schell et al., 2015 [15].
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date. Variations on this policy have been implemented around the world, from the EU
20-20-20 to diverse renewable portfolio standards in U.S. states and municipalities. This
work analyzes economic, environmental and social aspects of a geographic attribution (i.e.
Isolated, Regional or Country) of an RET to gain insights on the associated tradeoffs. In
the case study of the Azores Islands, Portugal, the regional geographic attribution of an
RET captures the best of all three tradeoffs.
2.1 Introduction
In its most recent report (2014), the IPCC has, for the first time, specifically stated that
investment in low-carbon electricity production is a “key measure” in climate change mit-
igation [16]. The IPCC stresses that investment in low-carbon electricity supply will need
to support an increase from the current share of 30% production globally, to at least 80%
by 2050. In order to achieve this goal, hundreds of billions of dollars annually, by 2030, will
need to be invested in low-carbon electricity [16].
2.1.1 Renewable Energy Targets (RETs)
Climate change is an urgent problem, and political pressure to address it has already led
to the development of numerous policy instruments to encourage investment in renewable
energy. Many governments have issued renewable energy targets (RETs), which mandate
that a certain percent of electricity production is generated from renewable sources by a
specified date. The European Union (EU) famously enacted its EU 20-20-20 policy in
2007, which, among other targets, requires 20% of its total energy supply to come from
renewable resources by the year 2020 [17]. In 2001, the Australian government implemented
the world’s first nationally mandated RET of 20% by 2020 [18].
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In addition to the 27 EU member states and Australia, many major global players -
including China and South Africa - have instituted RETs as policy tools to encourage
investment in renewable energy. Though the United States (U.S.) does not have a federal
energy policy, over half the states have implemented RET regulation, encouraging renewable
energy development in the electricity sector. Two of the highest targets are in the states
of Hawaii and California, with a 40% RET by 2030 [19], and a 33% RET by 2020 [20],
respectively. State-level renewable targets are so common [21] that the U.S. Department
of Energy has established a database to track legislative targets and developments [22].
Table 2.1: List of abbreviations used throughout this article.
Abbreviation Description
ERSE Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços Energéticos
(Portuguese Energy Regulator)
EU European Union
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme
GEP Generation Expansion Planning model
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MAC Marginal Abatement Cost curve
ReEDS Renewable Energy Deployment System model
RET Renewable Energy Target
U.S. United States of America
2.1.2 RET Policy Analysis
Due to the worldwide prevalence of RET policies, work in several fields, including public
policy [18][23][24], economics [25][26], and operations research [27], has been conducted
to address the varying impacts of RET policies. To the best of the authors’ knowledge,
little analysis exists on how best to set an RET. Whether RETs are better set at the local,
regional, or country level remains an unexamined question.
In practice, setting a renewable energy target is fundamentally political. Once an RET
is agreed upon by the government, an analysis of the policy is usually undertaken, such
as through a Regulatory Impact Assessment in the U.S., to ensure the policy will not
recklessly effect existing market players [28]. This type of evaluation typically involves
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Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves, which are usually developed for a specific region
and timeframe, to assess available technology options and associated costs. A recent
study from the World Bank [29], however, asserts that MAC curves have a tendency to be
misinterpreted, specifically when designing an RET policy. For an RET, it is usually most
effective to implement the highest cost technologies first. The study also finds that RET
targets set too low (below 25%) may be adversely effecting future investment in renewable
energy, and hindering achievement of higher goals [29].
2.1.3 RET Technical Analysis
Despite the prevalence of RET policy and policy analysis, little has been done on the
technical side to incorporate RETs into electricity system modeling for long term planning.
Bird, et al. [30] have used the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory’s (NREL)
model, ReEDS [31], to examine the least-cost generation and transmission expansion plans
under a renewable energy target policy, a carbon cap-and-trade policy, and a combination
of the two. The highest RET considered, however, is 25%. Wave generation capacity is
not considered as a technology option in their model.
Furthermore, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no studies have looked at the effects
of the geographic attribution of an RET. The term geographic attribution defines the area
(isolated, regional, or country) that must meet the target. Many RET policies are defined
as a country goal, such as in China. Liu, et al. [32] take the country RET for China and
develop a model to decompose the national RET to the regional level. However, they do
not determine whether the RET is best set at the isolated, regional, or country level.
Hiremath, et al. [33] stress that socio-economic and environmental impacts should be
evaluated by the model at the local level. Foley, et al. [34] review numerous electricity
system models and emphasize the need for electricity system models that can incorporate
key policy changes, including targets to increase the share of renewable energy production.
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Zhou et al. [35] have developed a complex, bilevel optimization model of the generation
side of the electricity system that considers incentive policies for electricity producers - such
as production tax credits, an investment tax credit, or a carbon tax - and compares these
policies to a mandatory RET. They conclude that incentive policies can be as efficient as
an RET, though their analysis only considers a low RET range, from 10% - 25%. They
concede that incentive policies may be much less effective at higher RETs. The question
of the optimal geographic attribution of an RET is not addressed.
2.1.4 RET Social Benefits
Politically, renewable energy targets are designed to increase investment in renewable energy
generation and thereby decrease greenhouse gas emissions. RET policies can also have
added societal benefits, including air emissions reductions and the resulting health benefits
[36], energy security, fuel diversity, and job creation [37]. This work examines the social and
environmental benefits of an RET in terms of emissions reductions, as well as the economic
cost of implementation.
2.1.5 Aim and Objectives
The aim of this research is to analyze the local economic, social and environmental im-
pacts of the geographic attribution of a renewable energy target. The authors seek to
uncover the tradeoffs associated with a local, regional and country RET policy. Through
analyzing these tradeoffs, we hope to inform both policymakers and stakeholders about the
potential effects that the geographic attribution of an RET can have on optimal generation
investment, equitable renewable investment distribution across localities and local emissions
reductions. Our ultimate objective is for the conclusions of this work to help inform RET
policy formation.
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2.1.6 Article Structure
In Section 2.2 we describe the modeling framework with which the geographic attribution
of an RET is analyzed. Section 2.3 presents the results of this analysis, the local effects
of an RET attribution and the model limitations. Section 2.4 reports the main findings of
this study.
2.2 Methodological Framework
In this section, we describe the methodological approaches we employ in analyzing the
effects of different geographic attributions of an RET. We also present the parameters of
the case study analyzed - the Azores Islands, Portugal.
2.2.1 Generation Expansion Planning
We adapt an electricity system planning technique commonly used in the literature [30]
[38] [39] [40] [41] [42], known as Generation Expansion Planning (GEP)1. GEP refers to
electricity system power generation capacity [43]. Mixed integer optimization methods are
used to find the optimal way to expand the generating capacity in an electricity system in
order to meet predicted demand growth, given a set of expansion alternatives. We include
the restriction that the capacity expansions must also enable sufficient renewable energy
production to meet a given RET.
Decision Variables and Parameterization
The generation expansion planning model solves for three major decision variables: 1) how
many capacity additions should be made to what technology, on what island, CEgi; 2) the
1For a more in-depth discussion on the applicability of GEP to Island/Isolated electricity systems, see
2.5
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total capacity (existing plus expansions) of each technology, on each island, Cgi; 3) and
the operating level of each technology, on each island, Wgil.
To describe the electricity generation system on the islands, we include the existing ca-
pacity of electricity generation as of the start of 2008 [4]. Using demand growth predictions
and natural resource limitations from the Green Islands Azores Project [44] [2]2, the GEP
model solves for the least-cost expansions that will meet the renewable energy target in
2018. Table 4.1 completely details the model parameters, with data presented in Section
4.3.
Table 2.2: Model parameters
Symbol Description Units
αg investment cost of technology r [$/kW]
δg operating cost of technology r [$/kWh]
Di annual demand on island i [kWh]
Ll approximation of load duration curve
by load type l (base, middle, peak) [%]
C0gi existing generation capacity, g, on island i [kW]
CMgi natural resource limitation
to generation capacity expansion, on island i [kW]
CEIgi size of expansion for generation capacity, g,
on island i [kW]
CFgi capacity factor of generation capacity, g,
on island i [%]
Pli annual peak load on island i [kW]
RM reserve margin [%]
Arg availability of generation capacity g 0/1
for reserve capacity
REg classification of generation capacity g 0/1
as renewable
Bgl availability of generation capacity g, 0/1
by load type l
RET renewable energy target [%]
h number of hours per year
M sufficiently large number
2The Green Islands Azores Project Report assessed the future electricity demand on the islands based on
detailed studies predicting sector-level economy expansion (i.e. agriculture, industry, residential, etc.) on
each island. The results of the analysis conducted for renewable energy expansion potential on the islands
is informed by a detailed resource analysis, including land availability for both the siting of new generation
and the potential expansion of the electricity grid. Thus, infeasible siting locations are not considered in
our analysis.
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Objective Function
The objective of the model is to minimize system cost, which we define as the annualized
investment cost of new capacity, plus the operating cost of both new and existing capacity.
This is mathematically defined as Equation (2.1).
minimize
∑
g
∑
i
(αgCEgiCEIgi +
∑
l
δgWgil) (2.1)
Capacity Constraints
Any expansion that occurs must take into consideration the existing capacity on the island,
C0gi, (2.2), and the natural resource limitations, CMgi, on the island (2.3).
Cgi = C0gi + CEgiCEIgi ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ I (2.2)
CEgiCEIgi ≤ CMgi ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ I (2.3)
Additionally, there must be enough generation capacity in the system that can act as reserve
capacity (2.4). As is common practice, we require a reserve margin of 20% [38][45][46].
∑
g
ArgCgiCFgi ≥ Plg(1 +RM) ∀i ∈ I (2.4)
This reserve margin is a conservative estimate of what might be needed in a system with a
high penetration of intermittent renewable energy, such as wind and solar power [47].
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Operating Constraints
The following contraints ensure that the system meets operational standards, such as re-
quiring that supply must always meet demand (2.5).
∑
g
BglWgil = DiLl ∀l ∈ L, i ∈ I (2.5)
Equation (2.6) ensures that a generation technology is assigned only to a load type to which
it can reasonably respond. Illustratively, this constraint protects against solar power being
assigned to meet night-time base load. In our analysis we consider that geothermal, diesel,
fuel oil and biogas can meet all load types, while the other generation capacities are only
available to meet middle load.
Wgil ≤ BglM ∀g ∈ G, l ∈ L, i ∈ I (2.6)
Further, the operating level of each technology cannot exceed its expected availability, given
by its annual average capacity factor (2.7). The capacity factors used in this study were
taken from the results of the Green Islands study [2]. The annual average capacity factor
ranges are presented in Table 2.3.
∑
l
Wgil ≤ CgiCFgih ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ I (2.7)
The final operational constraint provides that the renewable energy generation capacity
in the system is sufficient to meet the renewable energy production target. Renewable gen-
eration capacity investments considered for the islands are wind, offshore wind, hydropower,
geothermal, solar photovoltaic, wave and biogas. The only renewable technology considered
3Where islands have differing average annual capacity factors for a certain generation capacity, a range
among the island values is presented. Where the capacity factor is the same among islands, that single
annual average value is presented.
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Table 2.3: Average annual capacity factors [2]
Capacity factor, CFg3
[%]
Wind 25.0 - 32.9
Offshore Wind 27.0 - 34.9
Hydropower 40.0
Geothermal 72.1
Solar 11.6
Wave 30.0
Diesel 79.1
Fuel Oil 79.1
Biogas 79.1
that has not yet been implemented somewhere on the Azores is offshore wind [4].
∑
g
∑
l
REgWgil ≥ (RET )Di ∀i ∈ I (2.8)
Total capacity and operating level decision variables are subject to non-negativity con-
straints, as presented in (2.9) and (2.10).
Cgi ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ I (2.9)
Wgil ≥ 0 ∀g ∈ G, i ∈ I, l ∈ L (2.10)
The number of capacity expansions permitted are restricted to integer values.
CEgi in integer (2.11)
This constraint precludes investment in half a wind turbine, for example.
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2.2.2 Maximum Renewable Energy Production Per Island
The generation expansion planning model presented in the previous section (2.2.1), solves
for the least-cost expansion plans to meet an RET. We utilize an optimization methodology
known as the e-constraint method [48], to also solve for the maximum renewable energy
production possible on each island. To do so, we simply change the objective function of
the original GEP model to maximize the production of renewable energy, z∗, on the island,
as in (2.12).
z∗ = maximize
∑
g
∑
l
REgWgl (2.12)
This value, z∗, is used again in the original GEP model, and replaces the right hand side
of Equation 2.8, as shown below in (2.13).
∑
g
∑
l
REgWgil ≥ z∗ ∀i ∈ I (2.13)
The solution of this revised problem gives the least-cost expansion plan, at the maximum
renewable energy production. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.10,
Section 2.3.1.
2.2.3 Case Study and Data
We apply our analysis to a geographically diverse case study: the Azores Islands, Portugal.
An archipelago of nine islands off the western coast of the Iberian peninsula (see Figure
2.1), their dependence on fossil fuels has driven the Azorean government to establish an
ambitious RET of 75% by 2018 [2]. How best to meet this target will depend on its
geographic attribution.
Each island in the Azores archipelago has a unique electricity system, isolated from the
15
Chapter 2. Geographic Attribution of an Electricity System Renewable Energy Target
Figure 2.1: The Azores Islands [1]. An autonomous region of Portugal, the Azores Islands lie 1,400 km off the western coast
of the Iberian peninsula. The archipelago’s geographical isolation has led to a reliance on fossil fuel imports (diesel and fuel
oil) for electricity production. The electric utility is expanding investment in renewable energy, to meet the government’s 75%
RET for 2018.[2]
Table 2.4: Existing Generation Capacity in 2008. Electricity generation on the islands is dominated by diesel and fuel oil,
which together account for over 81% of total generation capacity [4].
2008 Generation Capacity, C0gi [kW]
Corvo Flores Graciosa Santa Maria São Jorge Pico Faial Terceira São Miguel
Wind - 600 800 900 1,150 1,800 1,800 4,500 -
Offshore Wind - - - - - - - - -
Hydropower - 1,484 - - - - 320 1,432 5,030
Geothermal - - - - - - - - 27,800
Solar - - - - - - - - -
Wave - - - - - - - - -
Diesel 536 2,327 4,230 5,680 7,090 - - - -
Fuel Oil - - - - - 13,388 17,010 61,116 98,064
Biogas - - - - - - - - -
others. Table 2.4 shows that all islands currently rely heavily on fossil fuels in the form of
diesel and fuel oil. Some have limited renewable resource production from sources such as
wind, hydropower and geothermal energy.
Existing natural resource limits preclude unlimited renewable resource exploitation on
the islands. Table 2.5 shows the best data available concerning the Azores Islands [2].
A major limiting factor on the islands is the dearth of exploitable geothermal resources
on seven out of the nine islands. Available hydropower expansion is almost as scarce.
Fuel for biogas production, using cow manure as a feedstock, is estimated based on the
number of cows on each island [49]. Agriculture and dairy production is a large part of the
Azorean economy, with cows outnumbering the human population on some of the smallest
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Table 2.5: Natural resource limitations on generation capacity expansion. Based on the Green Islands study of the natural
resource reserves of renewable energy on the islands, the table shows that possibly binding limits exist for wind, hydropower,
geothermal and biogas expansion [2].
Maximum Capacity Expansion, CMgi [kW]
Corvo Flores Graciosa Santa Maria São Jorge Pico Faial Terceira São Miguel
Wind 140 160 280 600 1,700 800 800 9,100 18,300
Offshore Wind 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
Hydropower - 527 - - 1,670 1,230 25 293 6,754
Geothermal - - - - - - - 12,000 47,650
Solar 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
Wave 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
Diesel 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
Fuel Oil 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000 50,000
Biogas 48 396 471 528 894 1,419 1,501 5,312 12,805
Table 2.6: Capacity Expansion Integral. Expansions in generation capacity are limited by the size of the turbine [4].
Turbine size of generation capacity, CEIgi [kW]
Corvo Flores Graciosa Santa Maria São Jorge Pico Faial Terceira São Miguel
Wind 300 300 200 300 164 300 300 900 3004
Offshore Wind 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Hydropower 500 370 500 - 500 500 320 475 700
Geothermal - - - - - - - 3,000 5,000
Solar 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290
Wave 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
Diesel 135 500 700 945 1,000 2,200 2,000 6,000 12,000
Fuel Oil 135 500 700 500 1,000 2,200 2,000 6,000 12,000
Biogas 48 390 470 500 890 700 1,500 5,300 12,000
islands [50]. In technologies where there is almost unlimited potential for expansion, an
unattainable expansion value of 50,000 kilowatts [kW] is given.
Capacity expansions are additionally limited by the size of the generator. As shown in
Table 2.6, the typical size of a wind turbine on the Azores is 300 kW, while the size of
a diesel generator ranges from 135 - 12,000 kW [4]. The difference in sizing can make
different technologies attractive at different RETs. A small generator is more advantageous
to meet an incremental increase in an RET, whereas larger investments will be attractive
for higher RETs. The diversity of the alternatives available, however, makes this decision
nontrivial.
4The data presented here are from the Green Islands Report [2], published in 2010. Since then, larger
wind turbines (900 kW) have been used on São Miguel.
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Capacity expansions will be necessary in order to meet future growth in demand on the
islands. Demand projections for the Azores target year of 2018 are derived from economic
growth projections completed by the Green Islands study [2]. The forecasted percentage
increase in demand for each island are applied to the realized demand on the islands in
2008 [4].
Table 2.7: Demand and peak load in 2018. The annual demand per island, as well as annual peak load, using forecasted
growth values from the Green Islands study [2].
Annual Demand and Peak Load
2018 Demand, Di 2018 Peak Load, Pli
[kWh] [kW]
Corvo 1,463,212 299
Flores 15,687,379 2,721
Graciosa 18,195,214 3,108
Santa Maria 27,188,099 4,641
São Jorge 37,968,238 6,330
Pico 63,031,316 10,847
Faial 69,715,622 11,719
Terceira 295,291,599 51,476
São Miguel 606,926,090 102,092
Total demand is apportioned into an approximated annual load duration curve using
percentages from the energy regulatory utility of Portugal, Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços
Energéticos (ERSE), in Table A.3 [5].
Table 2.8: Annual load duration curve approximation. The percentages in the table below divide the annual load duration
curve into the amount of base, middle and peak load that must be met in 2018 [5].
Load Duration Curve Approximation
Ll [%]
Base 41.67
Middle 41.67
Peak 16.66
ERSE has also published operating costs for renewable energy production on the Azores
Islands (Table 2.9). Many renewables, including wind, hydropower, geothermal, solar and
wave energy, are cheaper to operate on the islands than on mainland Portugal. Data for
mainland Portugal is presented in A.1.
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Table 2.9: Cost data. The cost data for the Azores Islands is from ERSE [5], the International Renewable Energy Agency
(IRENA) [6], and the International Energy Agency (IEA) [7]. Costs are annualized based on an 8% discount rate and a 20
year lifetime of generation investments.
Annualized Costs
Operating Cost, δg Investment Cost, αg
[$/kWh] [$/kW]
Wind 0.0900 261
Offshore Wind 0.0490 562
Hydropower 0.0900 615
Geothermal 0.0220 397
Solar 0.3250 569
Wave 0.0560 629
Diesel 0.0420 130
Fuel Oil 0.0430 137
Biogas 0.0800 574
2.2.4 Scenarios
The Azores Islands case study is analyzed using a set of three scenarios, based on the geo-
graphic attribution of the RET. In Scenario 1 - Isolated, each island is individually required
to meet the RET, as a proportion of its own demand. This is represented mathematically
in Equation 4.5.
Scenario 2 - Regional sets the geographic bound of the RET as the entire archipelago,
allowing renewable energy production from any island to count toward meeting the target.
In this case, the RET is applied to the combined demand of all islands in the archipelago.
This modifies the right hand side of constraint 2.8, as in Equation 2.14 below.
∑
g
∑
l
∑
i
REgWgil ≥ (RET )
∑
i
Di (2.14)
The largest geographic attribution of the RET is at the country level, Scenario 3 - Country,
where renewable electricity production in Portugal qualifies as meeting the Azores RET. In
this situation, Equation 2.8 becomes:
∑
l
(
∑
g
∑
i
REgWgil +
∑
gport
REportWgportl) ≥ (RET )(
∑
i
Di + Dport) (2.15)
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The generation capacity technologies available on mainland Portugal are different from the
generation technologies used on the islands (see A.1). Therefore, a new parameter, REport
must be defined, to specify which of these technologies are renewable. The GEP model is
also expanded with duplicates of Equations 2.2 - 2.7 and Equations 2.9 - 2.11, specified
for the electricity system of mainland Portugal. Similarly, the objective function is updated
to include investment and operating costs specific to the continent. Data for mainland
Portugal can be found in Appendix A.1.
2.2.5 Limitations
The model proposed above does not consider electricity storage or energy efficiency as
technology options available to meet an RET because reliable data are not available for
these technologies for the Azores Islands.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Scenario 1 - Isolated
Using the e-constraint method described in Section 2.2.2, we obtain the maximum renew-
able energy production achievable on each island. Table 2.10 displays these results, with
the islands ordered from lowest annual electricity demand (Corvo) to highest (São Miguel).
Due to varied natural resource limitations, only two islands can reach the 75% RET on their
own. These two islands, São Miguel and Terceira, are endowed with sufficient geothermal
resources to produce renewable electricity beyond the 75% RET. No other islands have
geothermal capacity suitable for electricity generation. A combination of wind, offshore
wind, biogas and wave are the preferred investments on such islands. A.2 details the op-
timal generation capacity investments for each island, at each RET, up to its maximum
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achievable RET. We note that investment decisions are discretized by RET percentage
point. Thus, reaching an RET of 50% does not depend on the investment decisions made
to reach an RET of 49%. The decisions are separate and, as such, the graphs in A.2, as
well as in the rest of the article, do not represent an evolution of investments from zero to
X% RET, rather they represent discrete investment plan solutions.
In the lower RET range, generally from zero up to 25%, wind is the preferred renewable
investment across the islands. After this point, a preference for biogas appears to replace
fossil fuels used in baseload capacity. Offshore wind is utilized at higher RETs, as a com-
plement to wind and biogas. If an island has some existing renewable capacity, such as
Flores, biogas is the only renewable energy generation capacity investment made. This is
due to its dispatchability for any load type.
Table 2.10: Maximum renewable energy production by island, with associated annualized cost.
Maximum Achievable Annualized Cost Annualized Cost
Renewable Energy Production [$2012] [$2012/kWh]
Corvo 64% 274,291 0.1875
Flores 58% 1,487,443 0.0948
Graciosa 59% 2,464,624 0.1355
Santa Maria 54% 3,426,387 0.1260
São Jorge 57% 5,530,256 0.1457
Pico 57% 8,751,799 0.1388
Faial 56% 9,408,336 0.1350
Terceira 79% 40,969,367 0.1387
São Miguel 100% 52,054,621 0.0858
Azores archipelago 85% 124,367,124 0.1095
The least cost investments necessary to achieve the maximum renewable energy pro-
duction vary by island. The size of the islands’ electricity demand and the indivisibility
of turbine/generator investments are the main drivers of this difference. This indivisibility
is known as “lumpiness" in the operations management literature [51]. In the context of
generation capacity investment, it is not possible to invest in half of a wind turbine. The
investment must be made for a whole turbine, even if it means this will result in a slight
overcapacity. The effect of lumpiness is seen clearly in the generation capacity expansion
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graphs in A.2, as well as in Figure 2.8, in Section 2.3.5. Up to 22% RET on Corvo island,
in Scenario 1 - Isolated (Figure 2.8), can be met with a single expansion in biogas that
provides from 1% to 22% renewable energy production.
We note that it is the islands with a high proportion of existing renewable energy capacity
that incur the lowest overall cost. The annualized cost per unit of production [$2012/kWh],
in Table 2.10, shows São Miguel with the lowest cost, followed by Flores, which is the second
smallest island in terms of demand. Flores incurs the second lowest cost, however, because
it already has significant investment in hydropower and wind on the island. Likewise, São
Miguel has significant existing investment in geothermal electricity production. Thus, the
higher the share of renewable sources, the lower the cost of system operation. While initial
achievement of an RET will have high associated capital costs, the long-term operational
costs of a high renewables system will be lower than a carbon-intensive system.
2.3.2 Scenario 2 - Regional
Even with the seemingly abundant natural, renewable resources available among all islands
in the archipelago, the highest RET that can be reached with a regional attribution is 85%.
This is due to operating constraints on each island, and their lack of interconnection. While
São Miguel has abundant geothermal capacity, it cannot overproduce to meet demand on
another island because the extra power cannot be transmitted off the island. Subsea power
cable transmission lines do not currently connect any of the islands in the archipelago. Our
GEP does not take into account possible expansions in transmission capacity, though this
could be a direction for future work, as increasing transmission capacity could improve the
maximum regional RET attainable.
In setting a regional RET, we see investment in renewable energy on smaller islands
only with an RET of 50% or higher. This is illustrated in the cost curves shown in Figure
2.2, which are flat until the 50% RET. Least-cost capacity expansion plans by island and
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by RET are detailed in Appendix A.3.
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Figure 2.2: Scenario 2 - Regional : Annualized system cost by island and for the entire archipelago (“System” axis), under
a regional attribution of the RET.
The regional RET is met first by existing renewable energy capacity on the islands, then
by investments in flexible renewable generation capacity that can meet multiple load types,
such as geothermal and biogas. As seen in Table 2.11, existing renewable energy on the
islands and investment in only geothermal capacity suffices up to a 50% RET. For higher
RETs, a combination of wind, geothermal and biogas is necessary. It is not until the highest
RET range, [76 - 85%], that investment occurs in offshore wind and additional hydropower.
The higher cost of these generation technologies make them less desirable investments at
lower RETs. Similarly, least desirable are solar and wave, which are never invested in,
in a regional RET attribution. A combination of high investment cost and low capacity
factor make solar generation unattractive on the Azores Islands. This is particularly true
with the resources available regionally, including geothermal, which can contribute more
efficiently to the RET. The investment cost of solar would need to fall to less than one-
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Table 2.11: Average percent [%] of total capacity expansions in an RET range, by generation technology. The capacity
expansions included here are the expansions that occur on the islands and do not include capacity expansions in mainland
Portugal. In Scenario 1, only the first two ranges can be reported, as not all islands can meet the higher RETs. Similarly,
the final RET range for Scenarios 2 and 3 go up to the maximum RET that is achieved in that scenario, 85% and 95%,
respectively.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Isolated Regional Country
RET range: [0-25%] [26-50%] [51-75%] [76-100%] [0-25%] [26-50%] [51-75%] [76-85%] [0-25%] [26-50%] [51-75%] [76-95%]
Wind 0.96 6.19 - - 0 0 7.83 20.33 0 0.39 16.55 24.60
Offshore Wind 0.20 9.33 - - 0 0 0.15 17.81 0 0 0 20.19
Hydropower 0 0.72 - - 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0
Geothermal 7.85 25.41 - - 4.58 54.94 60.20 37.96 19.75 64.99 53.77 46.17
Solar 0 0 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wave 0 0.43 - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Diesel 87.47 49.32 - - 94.68 44.36 17.04 8.81 75.86 28.95 14.80 10.04
Fuel Oil 0.45 0 - - 0.74 0.70 0.20 0.07 4.23 2.17 1.06 0.77
Biogas 3.07 8.62 - - 0 0 14.58 14.98 0.16 3.50 13.80 18.23
tenth of its current value, before it became an attractive investment. Even at such a low
cost, investment would not be advantageous at lower RETs (≤ 50%). With a 30% higher
capacity factor than solar, the investment cost for wave generation would need to fall by
only 13% before it becomes an attractive investment.
2.3.3 Scenario 3 - Country
As described in Equation 2.15, the country scenario refers to an RET that includes produc-
tion in both the Azores Islands and mainland Portugal. Thus, renewable energy capacity in
both places counts toward achieving this common goal. Table 2.11 shows that investment
in biogas on the islands occurs at lower RETs than it does under the Regional scenario.
The same is true for investment in wind power, though investment in wind does not occur
until at least 25% RET. Because additional renewable energy production from mainland
Portugal is available to meet the RET, investment in offshore wind on the islands is not
needed until RETs are set to the highest levels ([75-95%]). In this scenario, we see no
investment in additional hydropower, as well as no investment in solar or wave energy. This
is largely due to the higher costs associated with these technology options.
Compared to the Regional scenario shown in Figure 2.3, a country RET (Figure 2.4)
results in higher levels of renewable energy production on the islands, at lower RETs.
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Figure 2.3: Scenario 2 - Regional : renewable energy production on each island, per RET. In a regional attribution of the
RET, the smallest island, Corvo, never achieves higher than 22% renewable energy production. This is compared to 64%
renewable production achieved in Scenario 1 - Isolated.
A country attribution of an RET must meet a higher overall demand. This requires
more renewable energy investments at lower RETs, compared to Scenario 2. Even though
mainland Portugal can make larger lump investments in renewable energy than the islands
can, the smaller additional renewable energy capacities offered on the islands are still useful
in reaching a country RET. The lower cost of some renewables on the islands, compared to
mainland Portugal, is also a contributing factor to investment in renewables on the islands
in a country RET attribution. These two contributing factors interact, resulting in a local
investment mix that can change dramatically from one RET percentage point to the next.
Even up to the highest RETs, investments and production on relatively small islands
still occur. On São Jorge and Santa Maria, two middle-sized islands, investments are made
at even high RETs (greater than 60%). As with Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, A.4 details the
optimal capacity expansion investments by island and by RET.
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Figure 2.4: Scenario 3 - Country : renewable energy production on each island, per RET. In a country RET, smaller islands
have higher renewable energy production, at lower RETs, when compared to a regional RET. Because the demand pool is
larger, relatively cheap renewable energy on the islands is attractive at lower RETs.
2.3.4 Economic Implications
Figure 2.5 shows the archipelago-wide cost of the three different scenarios. Expectedly,
Scenario 1 - Isolated has the highest combined cost across RETs, as islands are required to
meet the RET with the limited insular capacity available to them. Scarcity of supply means
the islands must rely on generation options with higher costs.
Scenario 2 - Regional has lower archipelago-wide costs across RETs, as the pool of
renewable generation capacity expands. As the pool expands even further, in Scenario 3 -
Country, the resulting cost on the archipelago is generally more expensive than the regional
RET attribution, but less than the isolated. Intuitively, as the generation pool widens, the
cost should decrease because more and cheaper options become available. In the case of
mainland Portugal and the Azores, the cheaper renewables on the islands are attractive
to helping mainland Portugal meet its large demand. Thus, the country RET attribution
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results in more investment in geothermal, wind and biogas on the islands at lower RETs,
than in the regional scenario. This means that a country RET results in a more costly
exploitation of renewable energy from the Azores Islands standpoint.
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Figure 2.5: Costs per scenario Scenario 1 - Isolated has the highest archipelago-wide system cost, while the broader geographic
RET attribution in Scenario 2 - Regional takes advantage of lowest cost renewables across the archipelago, resulting in a
lower system cost across RETs. Scenario 3 - Country generally results in costs between Scenarios 1 and 2, though it is the
least cost option for the RET range 54% - 60%, and above 72%.
The cost of reaching an 85% RET in Scenario 2 - Regional is just over $122 million, or
$0.1077/kWh on the archipelago, whereas the cost of reaching a country-wide 85% RET
is $95.8 million, or $0.0844/kWh on the archipelago. The distribution of investments, and
thus the corresponding costs per island, vary widely. As is shown in A.5, the lowest cost
scenario for each island oscillates between a regional and a country RET attribution, with
the regional RET generally becoming the least cost solution in the higher RET range.
This is true for every island except São Miguel, whose lowest cost solution is always Sce-
nario 1 - Isolated, shown in Figure 2.6. In Scenarios 2 and 3, investment in and production
from geothermal energy is called upon earlier than is required for in the isolated scenario.
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Figure 2.6: Costs per scenario on São Miguel island. The least cost solution for the island of São Miguel is always Scenario
1 - Isolated. This is because, under any wider geographic attribution of an RET, the geothermal resources on São Miguel are
heavily exploited. This makes the other two scenarios more costly for São Miguel locally.
Additionally, geothermal on São Miguel is preferred to geothermal on Terceira because the
turbine size on São Miguel is larger. The interactions of an increased level of demand,
availability of low cost geothermal, and large size of the geothermal generation capacity
prioritize investment in geothermal on São Miguel to meet regional and country RETs.
Thus, both a country and regional RET result in a more expensive use of the renewable
capacity on São Miguel than in the isolated case.
For the archipelago as a whole, however, a broader geographic RET attribution generally
results in a net savings to the archipelago population. Figure 2.7 shows the cost savings of
a regional RET, as compared to isolated and country RETs.
Compared to Scenario 1 - Isolated, a regional RET is always cheaper, with a net annual
savings as high as $78 per capita, across the archipelago. The same is generally true of
the comparison with Scenario 3 - Country, except after a 72% RET. This crossover point
represents when investments in the regional RET maximize geothermal and biogas resources
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Figure 2.7: Net savings per capita of Scenario 2 - Regional RET attribution. Compared to Scenario 1 - Isolated, a regional
RET is always cheaper. The same is generally true of the comparion to Scenario 2 - Country, except after a 72% RET. This
crossover point represents when investments in the regional RET maximize geothermal and biogas resources on the islands.
on the islands. The same investment decisions occur in the country RET, but at 61%. After
this point, investments in renewable energy in mainland Portugal are used to achieve higher
RETs. While the country RET attribution represents a cost savings to the islands, it comes
at a social and environmental cost, discussed in Sections 2.3.5 and 2.3.6.
2.3.5 Social Considerations
As Figures 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate, investment and production of renewable energy at high
levels does not occur equally on the islands. Figure 2.8 shows the investment changes that
occur on two selected islands, between the three scenarios. Diverse investments occur on
the smallest island of Corvo when the RET is attributed at the geographically isolated level
(Scenario 1). As the geographic attribution of the RET becomes wider, other renewable
energy resources become available at lower cost. Consequently, investment on Corvo occurs
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Scenario 1 - Isolated
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Figure 2.8: Generation Capacity Investments According to RET Attribution: This figure shows how the generation capacity
investments change on the smallest island (Corvo) and largest island (São Miguel), when the Renewable Energy Target
geographic attainment boundary is enlarged. The broader the geographic RET region is, the less investment is made on
smaller islands.
only at higher RETs, when investment in its flexibly dispatchable biogas resource becomes
advantageous.
Investment in geothermal energy on São Miguel, the island with the highest demand,
consistently occurs in all three scenarios. This investment becomes more advantageous at
lower and lower RETs, as the geographic attainment boundary widens. At its broadest, in
Scenario 3, investments in biogas and wind energy on São Miguel also occur at lower RETs
than in the first two scenarios. These resources on the islands are valuable to mainland
Portugal because of their higher capacity factors than their counterparts on the mainland
(see Table 2.3 and Table A.1). Located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, the islands
have better wind potential than the mainland. Biogas also has a higher capacity factor in
the smaller electricity system of the Azores, as it is needed to meet all three load types.
Biomass on mainland Portugal is typically used for middle load only, though our results
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suggest major expansion may be necessary in biomass, particularly for RETs higher than
30% (see A.4).
Because of this disparity between investment locations, we analyze a policy mandating
a certain renewable energy production quota on each island, while also meeting the larger
RET. Figures 2.9 and 2.11 show the effect of an island renewable energy production quota
on annualized system cost. The quotas vary from zero to 54%, which is the minimum-
maximum isolated renewable energy production (see Table 2.10). Figure 2.9 shows that a
quota of 54% renewable energy production on each island is achievable for a small increase
in cost (4.4%, or 4.4 million [$2012]), at an overall RET of around 75%.
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Figure 2.9: Scenario 2 - Regional : Effect of renewable energy production quota [%] per island on system cost. Establishing
a quota for renewable energy production per island, while also meeting a regional RET, forces distribution of renewable energy
investments across the islands. At high RETs, such as the 75% target of the Azores government, the effect of a quota on
overall cost is small.
These results indicate that investment in renewable energy can be distributed among the
islands at a small increase from the absolute least-cost solution. Residents of the Azores
Islands may view distributed investsments as fairer, or more socially equitable, and may
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favor such a solution. Besides mandating renewable energy production, Figure 2.10 shows
that an increase in fossil fuel prices can also instigate investment in renewable energy.
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Figure 2.10: Scenario 2 - Regional : Effect of 75% diesel and fuel oil price increase on system cost. If the cost of diesel and
fuel oil were to rise by 75% each, the resulting increase in system cost would make a 50% archipelago-wide RET cost-effective.
Figure 2.10 shows how system costs change when diesel and fuel oil prices each increase
by 75%. The cost of continuing to use fossil fuel is 11% higher than running a system with
50% renewable energy production. Thus, a significant increase in fossil fuel prices can also
induce investment in renewable energy. With the current slump in oil prices, however, this
may not be likely to happen soon.
The effect of a per island quota on total cost (the Azores archipelago plus mainland
Portugal) in Scenario 3 becomes insignificant, when comparing the associated cost increase
with the total cost of the system. The annualized cost to meet any RET in Scenario
3 ranges from 6.8 to 11.7 billion [$2012 USD]. The cost of investment needed to meet
demand levels in mainland Portugal dominates the cost of renewable energy investment
distribution among the islands. At the highest RET, 95%, the difference between the least
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cost solution (0% renewable energy quota per island) and the highest cost solution (54%
renewable energy quota per island) is a mere 0.017%, around 2 million [$2012 USD].
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Figure 2.11: Scenario 3 - Country : Effect of renewable energy production quota [%] per island on system cost. Requiring a
per island production quota of renewable energy has a negligible effect on cost, when meeting a country RET. The investment
costs needed in mainland Portugal dominate the costs incurred on the Azores Islands.
Figure 2.11 shows the archipelago-wide cost of a country RET attribution, with island
renewable energy quotas. Above a 54% RET, the cost curves show that a higher renewables
requirement (i.e. higher per island renewable production quota) means higher cost. Below
54% RET, the 54% per island renewable production quota coincides with the 0% quota
because they are the same; the per island production quota is not required below its
equivalent RET value. Above a 60% RET, the costs of achieving a 10% or 20% per island
renewable production quota are equivalent.
At the highest RET of 95%, the difference between the least cost quota and the highest
cost quota is a 13.2% increase, or 12.7 million [$2012]. This cost is equivalently represented
as $0.0111/kWh. If a 150% increase in diesel and fuel oil prices were to occur, the 54%
renewable energy quota per island becomes economically cheaper. This is because a country
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RET attribution results in less renewable expansion on the islands when a quota is not
present, so increasing diesel prices will increase cost in such a system. This result shows
that a system with higher renewable energy generation capacity is more robust to fossil fuel
price shocks.
2.3.6 Environmental Effects
To approximate the environmental effects of the different scenarios, we estimate the carbon
dioxide equivalent (CO2eq) emissions associated with the production of electricity [52]. The
calculation of CO2eq emissions follows from Equation 2.16, where AF is the activity factor
and EF is the emissions factor. Here, the activity factor is the production of electricity,
Wgil.
Emissions = AF ∗ EF (2.16)
The emissions factors used are harmonized life-cycle emissions factors, derived from a meta-
analysis study conducted at the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) [8]. The values per generation technology are presented in Table 2.12
below. We analyze emissions from generation on the Azores Islands only. Because the
emissions factors are life-cycle, and include emissions incurred during construction, as well
as ancillary operational emissions, we note that a 50% RET does not generally result in
a 50% reduction in emissions. Similarly, a 100% RET does not mean zero greenhouse
gas emissions. This finding supports the climate mitigation argument for emissions-based
targets, in conjunction with renewable energy targets [17].
Figure 2.12 shows the annual emissions of operating the electricity system on the Azores
Islands, under the three scenarios of RET geographic attribution. We also analyze a high
(54%) and low (10%) case of renewable energy production quota per island, under a
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Table 2.12: Life-cycle emissions factors by generation technology [8].
Emissions Factor Source
[g CO2eq/kWh]
Wind 11 [53]
Offshore Wind 12 [53]
Hydropower 7 [54]
Geothermal 40 [54]
Solar 20 [55]
Wave 8 [54]
Diesel 979 [54]
Fuel Oil 979 [54]
Biogas 40 [54]
simultaneous Regional and Country RET attribution.
All three Regional scenarios generally have the highest emissions at any RET. Scenario
1 - Isolated coincides with the Regional 54%. Though the regional attribution with a 54%
renewable energy production quota produces the absolute lowest emissions at an 85% RET,
after 60% RET, emissions from all three regional scenarios approximately converge.
0 20 40 60 80 100
Renewable Energy Target (%)
     0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
E
m
is
si
o
n
s 
[t
o
n
s 
C
O
2
 e
q
]
Scenario 1 - Isolated
Scenario 2 - Regional
Regional 10%
Regional 54%
Scenario 3 - Country
Country 10%
Country 54%
Figure 2.12: System operating emissions per scenario. This graph shows the carbon dioxide-equivalent (CO2eq) emissions
associated with the annual operation of the electricity system on the Azores archipelago, under each scenario. As renewable
energy investment increases with higher RETs, emissions decrease. The greatest emissions reductions are achieved at the the
highest RET under the regional attribution.
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Scenario 3 - Country shows a step-wise decrease in emissions with increasing RET.
Scenario 3 with a renewable energy production quota of 54% consistently has the lowest
emissions out of all scenarios, until an 80% RET, after which all three regional scenarios
outpace it. A country RET attribution is the best for emissions reduction at RETs less
than 30%. For RETs greater than 60%, however, emissions reductions stagnate to around
263,000 tons CO2eq, while a regional RET can achieve further reductions of up to 65,000
tons CO2eq at its highest RET.
The tradeoffs between environmental, economic and social concerns are threefold: 1)
lower emissions occur under a country RET attribution, but 2) the cheaper RET attribution
is the regional, which, 3) also results in more diverse renewable generation investments
across the islands. The cost-effectiveness of each scenario, in terms of emissions reductions,
is assessed in Figure 2.13. This graph shows the increase in cost from the base case (0%
RET), per reduction in emissions from the base case. Lower RETs have less absolute
emissions reductions than higher RETs (see Figure 2.12).
At some low RETs in the country attribution, absolute zero cost per emissions reduction
represents the case where zero emissions reductions occur because there is no investment in
renewable energy on the islands. Sharp dips in the graph show where the rate of emissions
reductions is small, compared to the cost increase; both cost and emissions reductions are
always increasing from one RET to the next.
The isolated scenario is always the most costly way to reduce emissions, whereas the
regional scenario is generally the cheapest. Under a country RET, however, the islands
could achieve a 52% RET for $32 per ton CO2eq reduced. This is towards the top range
of the highest carbon trading price ever seen in the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS) [56]. If in Phase III of the EU ETS carbon market returns its heyday,
investing in renewable energy on the Azores Islands could be quite attractive to high-carbon
emitters, such as jet planes and cement factories.
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Figure 2.13: Cost-effectiveness of emissions reductions, in dollars per ton CO2eq reduced. The cost-effectiveness metric
displayed here is a typical metric displayed to policy makers. It illustrates the cost of carbon abatement per scenario, per
RET.
2.3.7 Discussion
Geographic attribution of an RET significantly affects economic, social and environmental
consequences of an RET policy. While an isolated, local attribution of an RET may be the
most expensive way to increase renewable energy production, it results in the most diverse
portfolio of renewable investments. In this locally attributed RET, investment is also spread
more widely across localities than when the RET geographic attribution is broader.
A regional attribution of an RET may be necessary in order to meet a high target. As is
the case for the Azores Islands, local natural resource limitations prohibit seven out of nine
islands from meeting the government’s 75% RET on their own. The regional RET allows
up to 85% renewable energy production, while taking advantage of lower-cost resources
available on different islands. Investments are not distributed equally across localities,
however. This disparity may result in social equity complaints from constituents. The
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emissions associated with a regional attribution closely follow the emissions seen in an
isolated attribution, but allow for higher emissions reductions at high RETs when compared
to a country RET attribution. The cost of emissions reductions ranges from $20 - 92 per
ton CO2eq abated, depending on scenario and RET. It is possible that carbon markets will
rebound such that these numbers are attractive for trading, though the recent price of two
euros per ton make this look unlikely.
Due to cost differences between regions, a country attribution of the RET still results in
local investment, though local investment and local renewable energy production is highly
dependent on the percentage point of the target. Similarly, local emissions reductions can
vary drastically by RET percentage point, with emissions reduction efforts stagnating at
high RETs.
To maximize the benefits of renewable energy production, a regional attribution of an
RET, along with a local renewable energy production quota, could be the best geographical
attribution, given local social considerations and emissions reductions standards. More
costly than a similar country RET, the regional RET plus local quota represents a middle
ground between economic considerations of least-cost investment and benefits of local
investment diversity and local emissions reductions.
2.4 Conclusions
We analyzed three different geographic attributions of an RET - Isolated, Regional and
Country - using a generation capacity expansion planning model to discern the optimal in-
vestment strategies in renewable energy. Evaluating the economic, social and environmental
tradeoffs of each scenario, the findings inform renewable energy target policy formation.
The results obtained from the Azores Island, Portugal case study indicate that target
setting is a delicate task, which should be subject to careful scrutiny prior to enacting official
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mandates. Indivisibility of generation capacity means that the optimal investment strategy
can change dramatically from one RET percentage point to the next. This is particularly
important for lower energy targets, which are currently the aim of many regional policies,
including the EU 20-20-20. Due to lumpiness, the portfolio of investments can change
completely; from biogas only at 22% RET, to offshore wind only at 23%, for example.
If the long-term goal is to maximize the amount of renewable energy production in the
system, the investment mix at the highest considerable RET should be investigated, as
incremental investments to meet lower RET targets may be contrary to the investments for
higher targets, possibly resulting in overcapacity and future unuse.
The modeling conducted in this study provides insights into how localities, regions
and countries can meet RETs in the short term (10 years out). With the possibility of
future investments in high voltage transmission lines, however, regions may be able to see
RET achievement at even lower cost. Transmission network expansion would allow greater
exploitation of flexible renewable resources, such as geothermal, since overproduction can
be transmitted to areas with subpar renewable resources. In the case of islands, adding
submarine power cable transmission may allow RET achievement even if an island has few
natural resources.
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2.5 Addendum
This Addendum addresses comments from the dissertation committee members, regarding
the preceding chapter. The same is true for subsequent addenda.
2.5.1 Modeling Island/Isolated Power Systems
Islands are among the most carbon intensive nations in the world, with the US Virgin Islands
ranking second highest in carbon usage per capita [57]. Further, it is estimated that Small
Island Developing States (SIDS) spend between 5% to 20% of their GDP on fossil fuel
imports [6].
The ease of transport and high energy density of fossil fuels, along with various po-
litical incentives, have resulted in island states’ and territories’ dependence on expensive
fuel sources for their electricity generation needs. Hawaii and the US Virgin Islands both
face electricity prices three and a half to over four times that of the average electricity
price on the continental US ($0.42/kWh [58] - $0.51/kWh [59] vs. $0.12/kWh [57], re-
spectively). Confronting dramatic increases in fossil fuel prices, many island states have
adopted ambitious renewable energy targets, to take advantage of their oftentimes-ample
existing renewable resources [60]. Hawaii has imposed a renewable energy target of 100%
production by 2040 [22], while the Azores Islands, Portugal have set a 75% RET for 2018
[2]. In both cases, investment in new renewable electricity generation facilities will most
likely be required. Finding the optimal plan for how, when and where these investments
should take place is the goal of the field of generation expansion planning [61].
Generation Expansion Planning (GEP)
Both the irreversibility of the investment, and the large capital expenditure incurred Lead
to the desire to make optimal decisions when investing in electricity generation systems.
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Models for optimal generation capacity expansion have been studied widely in both the
electric power research literature [40]. Originally a part of general, long-term resource
planning, GEP models were developed to meet predicted future growth in demand by
expanding generation capacity at the least cost [62]. Few publicly available models exist,
however, for governments, utilities and interested stakeholders to examine how to optimally
achieve least-cost generation expansion plans [63]. Furthermore, to the best of the authors’
knowledge, there is no publicly available model built to achieve a GEP specifically to meet
specific renewable energy targets.
Publicly Available Energy Planning Tools
Governments, utilities and public stakeholders have at their disposal a select few free elec-
tricity planning tools to help them analyze the cost of expanding generation to meet growing
demand. The only publicly available GEP optimization model was built by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the 1980s, to help countries analyze and incorporate nu-
clear generation into their long-term national electricity expansion plans [64]. The resulting
model, the Wien Automatic System Planning Package (WASP), was made freely available
to IAEA member states. Indeed, WASP was used for this purpose in 2007, to analyze the
competitiveness of nuclear generation on Sumatra island, Indonesia [65]. While WASP will
give the user the the optimal long-term, least-cost expansion plan, it comes at a price of
4 to 6 weeks of training [63]. Additionally, existing renewable energy generation can be
accounted for in the model, but the modular design of WASP renders it unable to develop
a GEP to meet a specific renewable energy target [64].
HOMER (Hybrid Optimization of Multiple Energy Resources)5 is a microgrid simulation
and optimization tool, that will determine the least-cost annual system operation, given a
user-selected portfolio of generators from which to invest. HOMER builds a system from
5Free 30-day trial, with reduced academic license fees.
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scratch, and thus is not an expansion planning tool that considers already available genera-
tion. Furthermore, as a microgrid tool, it cannot handle modeling more than 20 generators,
which is only 16% of the total number of generators currently installed across the entire
Azores archipelago. Thus, while potentially useful as for a single, small island, HOMER can-
not handle the Regional or Country scenarios performed in 2.2. Finally, HOMER does not
have a feature to optimize the system configuration to a certain RET, further necessitating
the need for the GEP model that was developed in 2.2.
A popular entire energy system planning tool used by governments and stakeholders is
LEAP (Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning). It is a very broad tool, typically used to
“track energy consumption, production, and resource extraction [across] all sectors of the
economy ” [63]. As such, it can be used to model only the electricity system, with its own
methodology for determining generation capacity expansion. The underlying methodology,
however, is simply a scenario analysis, not an optimization [66].
While other long-term energy planning models exist, with the capability of being adapted
to generate a GEP, these models are either not truly free (MARKAL/TIMES, H2RES,
NEMS, SimREN, WILMAR Planning Tool, TRNSYS16), and/or not give optimal solu-
tions (EnergyPLAN, EMCAS, RETScreen, SimREN, TRNSYS16) [63]. For a full review
of “computer tools for analyzing the integration of renewable energy into various energy
systems,” we direct the reader to Connolly [63].
2.5.2 Recent literature
Generation expansion planning
The recent literature in generation expansion planning has moved away from the centralized
decision maker and towards strategic investment in competitive, restructured markets [39]
[43] [61] [40]. For most islands, however, the electricity market is non-competitive, and the
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GEP problem can be simplified into one of a centralized decision maker. Antunes, et al. [38]
adopt the view of the single decision maker, and develop a multi-objective mixed-integer
linear program for optimizing GEP. Their model does not include renewable generation,
however, and is not validated on a real electricity system. Bakirtzis, et al. [43] formulate
a centralized GEP problem and include renewables as expansion options. They model grid
reliability requirements by allowing a maximum renewable energy penetration, and, while
they test their model on the Greek electric system, it is not validated on it [43]. Similarly,
Bird, et al. allow for certain renewable generation expansion in their joint GEP and TEP
(transmission expansion planning) optimization model, but the highest RET tested is 25%.
Renewable energy penetration on Islands
Various models have been used to analyze the feasible penetration of renewable energy
into island grids, but the following have been formulated as least-cost, optimal GEPs.
Karapidakis, et al. [67] utilized LEAP to analyze a 20% RET for the island of Crete. The
candidate renewable energy generation expansions are set exogenously and compared to
a base scenario, thus giving no indication of the optimality of the RET solution. Duic
and Carvalho apply the H_2RES model to the water, electricity and heat energy sectors
of Porto Santo, in Madeira archipelago. The model uses as much renewable energy as is
technically feasible, which is defined by the user. The model does not consider costs, and
thus is not an optimal least-cost solution. This model seeks to fill the gap between optimal
generation expansion planning models and the feasible achievement of renewable energy
targets, specifically for the island context.
2.5.3 Methodology
In its extended form, GEP is a “large-scale, highly constrained mixed-integer non-linear
programming problem, the global optimum of which can be reached only by complete enu-
43
Chapter 2. Geographic Attribution of an Electricity System Renewable Energy Target
meration” [43]. The combination of decision variables considered in real systems, including
the amount of capacity in the system and the output of this capacity, can quickly make
the GEP problem intractable. Full enumeration of a GEP at the hourly-time scale could
take months to solve. In order to reduce run time and make the model useful for decision
makers, we develop a GEP that reasonably accurately models the actual island system, yet
is as simple as possible. Following a common approach in the literature, we consider a
static investment plan for 20 years in the future [39] [40] [41]. We build the model using
open-source Python 2.6.7 [68], with the PYCpx wrapper [69] for CPLEX, an optimization
solver that is freely available for academic use [70].
2.5.4 GEP Limitations
A GEP answers the aforementioned question of what type, when, where and how much
generation capacity should be invested in, in order to meet predicted future demand and
RETs. The model results give a first-order idea of what new renewable capacity should
be considered for further investigation. In the context of the Azores Islands case study,
for example, the least-cost GEP results suggest significant investment in offshore wind
and biogas generation, two generation types which are not yet being fully studied by the
electric utility. Consequently, a GEP analysis can bring to the forefront plausible generation
alternatives that may ordinarily not be under consideration.
The GEP results, however, cannot be directly used for investment decisions. They
must first be verified in a shorter time-frame, production simulation model, such as a
unit-commitment/dispatch model [71]. This requires more detailed data and predictions
of the actual renewable energy output, including hourly predictions for wind, offshore wind
and solar power output. This is necessary for two main reasons: 1) island and isolated
electric power systems are particularly fragile, and are markedly vulnerable to frequency
fluctuations; 2) high penetrations of renewable generation, in general, require detailed,
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hourly-level operational planning, particularly if there is no storage in the electricity system.
It is widely recognized that high levels of renewable penetration (above 50%) in small, non-
interconnected island/isolated electricity systems require some type of storage (flywheels,
pumped hydropower or grid batteries) in order to maintain system reliability.
An area of future work would be to assess the impact of storage on the optimal GEP
output. This would require model enhancements to account for at least hourly level unit-
commitment plans. The results of such an analysis would likely show a slight decrease in
the number of new renewable generation investments required. If pumped-hydro storage is
a cost-effective option on the islands, the necessary generation investments may be even
further reduced.
2.5.5 Assumption Limitations and Future Work
In the case study in 2.3, it was assumed that geothermal generation on the Azores Islands
was flexible and dispatchable, and therefore could be used to meet peak load. While there
are many different types of geothermal power plants [72] with many different efficiencies,
it is generally not possible to ramp up geothermal power generation fast enough to be
considered dispatchable. In the Azores Islands case, it is not possible at all to control the
output of their geothermal power plant [73]. Altering this assumption would change the
optimal investment plans presented in 2.3. Investment in biogas would substitute for the
current investment in geothermal expansion. Given the tradeoffs in economics and resource
availability on São Miguel, investments in wind, offshore wind and wave energy would likely
follow.
This mix of highly stochastic, non-dispatchable renewable energy illustrates the impor-
tance of carefully considering the generation needed for operational reserves, in an electric
system with a high amount of renewable energy generation [74][75]. 2.2 assumed a reserve
margin of 20%, but the adequacy of this assumption should be subjected to further reli-
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ability tests [74]. Combining operational reserve studies with GEP is a promising area of
future work.
46
Chapter 3
Probabilistic Cost Prediction for
Submarine Power Cable Projects
It is estimated that Europe alone will need to add over 250,000 km of transmission capacity
by 2050, if it is to meet renewable energy production goals while maintaining security of
supply. Estimating the cost of new transmission infrastructure is difficult, but it is crucial
to predict these costs as accurately as possible, given their importance to the energy tran-
sition. Transmission capacity expansion plans are often founded on optimistic projections
of expansion costs. We present probabilistic predictive models of the cost of submarine
power cables, which can be used by policymakers, industry, and academia to better approx-
imate the true cost of transmission expansion plans. The models are both generalizable
and well-specified for a variety of submarine applications, across a variety of regions. The
best performing statistical learning model has slightly more predictive power than a simpler,
linear econometric model. The specific decision context will determine whether the extra
data gathering effort for the statistical learning model is worth the additional precision. A
case study illustrates that incorporating the uncertainty associated with the cost predic-
This chapter is based on Schell et al. 2016 [76].
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tion to calculate risk metrics - value-at-risk and conditional-value-at-risk - provides useful
information to the decision-maker about cost variability and extremes.
3.1 Introduction
The first submarine power cable used for electricity transmission was commissioned in 1954,
connecting the electric grid of Gotland Island to Sweden’s mainland grid. The cable was
rated at 20 megawatts (MW), traversing a submarine route length of 98 kilometers (km)
[77]. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the proposed EuroAsia Interconnector would
connect the electricity grid of Israel to Greece via Cyprus, with a total rated transmission
capacity of 2,000 MW, traversing a submarine route length of over 1,500 km, at a maximum
depth of over 2,700 meters. The most ambitious to date, this submarine cable project has
an estimated cost of 1.5 billion euros [78].
Over the past fifty years, submarine power cables have been employed in diverse appli-
cations, including: crossing bays, lakes or rivers; providing supply to islands from mainland
grids; sharing supply between islands; interconnecting national grids; providing supply to
offshore oil and gas rigs; and, most recently, for offshore wind power connection [77].
Both offshore wind power and national-level grid interconnections - in the seas of North-
ern Europe and the Mediterranean - figure heavily in the European Union’s (EU) plans for
achieving ambitious renewable energy goals. In Germany, the North and Baltic seas alone
are seeing the construction and operation of 33 offshore wind farms, totaling 13.5 Gigawatts
(GW) of capacity [79][80]. The push for renewable production is not limited to Europe:
and so, worldwide, the submarine power cable industry is expected to grow by 45% in the
next decade [81].
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3.1.1 Cost Estimation Techniques
When project cost estimation is conducted in the planning phase of large infrastructure
projects, it is usually done through Unit Cost Estimation (UCE) [82]. This method requires
a cost estimate for each unit or process being built, as well as knowledge of the unit’s
depreciation rate, salvage value, expected lifetime, and expected repair and maintenance
costs. An informative example of this method of cost estimation is illustrated in [83].
As in most engineering economic models, these cost estimates are based on the expected
values of the costs of many individual components. This is problematic because it does not
account for the uncertainty surrounding each individual input cost, or how the costs relate
to each other; positively correlated costs compound uncertainty, but negatively correlated
costs can reduce uncertainty. Thus, using expected value inputs does not guarantee an
expected value output of a UCE model.
Because the required data for UCE is too often proprietary, researchers have recently
studied how to apply statistical methods to infrastructure project cost estimation. With
more sophisticated mathematical models, a reasonably accurate cost estimate could be
made with less detailed input data.
3.1.2 Early Cost Prediction for Infrastructure Planning
Infrastructure planning is a major undertaking, with just the planning phase typically span-
ning years. To determine the potential feasibility of an infrastructure project, an estimate
of the project cost is needed fairly early in the planning stage, when specific project details
are not fully known. However, it is in the early planning stages that management decides
whether or not to proceed with a project. Thus, it is imperative to have the cost estimated
as early and as accurately as possible.
To this end, several types of infrastructure projects have utilized methods in statistical
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learning for early cost prediction. These methods include linear regressions, classification
trees and artificial neural networks, applied to various infrastructure projects such as metro
network planning [84], bridge construction [85], highway projects [86], and road reconstruc-
tion [87].
The statistical methods used in these studies have been applied to either small data
sets of projects (n = 12 to 18) [84][86], or to data sets within a specific region [85][87][88].
The results of model-fit from such data sets can seem excellent (with R2 values of greater
than 0.9), but are usually too optimistic, as such a model is not generalizable to many
other cases.
In this paper, we develop probabilistic models to support early cost prediction for sub-
marine power cable projects. The final models presented in Section 3.3 are based on a
global database of 61 submarine cable projects. This makes the models both generalizable
and well-specified for a variety of applications (i.e. submarine power cable projects for island
supply, offshore wind farm connection, and grid interconnection, inter alia), across a variety
of regions.
3.1.3 Paper Structure
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the global submarine power
cable project database. Section 3.3 elaborates on the statistical learning methods applied
to the data set. Section 3.4 details the predictive accuracy of the final models. Section
3.5 applies the final models to a case study on submarine power cable replacement for
Vancouver Island, Canada.
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3.2 Data
The data is based on a privately maintained submarine power cable project database [89].
At the time of this study, the database contained a record of 296 projects, with each record
comprised of various project features. Data collected included project attributes like the
power (MW) and voltage (kV) of the submarine cable, manufacturer, armoring material,
and insulation type. Of the 36 project attributes sought, 22 were reported with sufficient
frequency to enable collection for a large number of projects. The contract cost of the
submarine power cable project was also collected for 106 projects.
The data was verified through a significant effort of cross-referencing sources of project
details: from company press releases to industry technical reports and presentations. When
not reported in the company press release, the maximum depth of the cable route was
obtained from bathymetry maps. After the verification of the 296 project records, it was
determined that the data for only 61 projects could be reliably substantiated. To reduce
the variability in the cost data, only costs reported in press releases from manufacturers
were used (e.g. [90]).
3.2.1 Project Attributes
There are many features of a project that can affect its cost. For submarine power cable
projects, materials costs, such as the cost of copper or aluminum used in the conductor, is
thought to be a large contributor to project cost. Thus, project attributes that represent
material cost were collected such as, the number of conductor cores in each cable (one core
for direct current (DC) and three cores for alternating current (AC)); the cross-sectional
area of the conductor in square-millimeters; the type of current (AC or DC); the number of
cables; the length of the submarine route of the cable(s); the type of conductor (copper,
Cu, or aluminum, Al); the voltage (kV) and power (MW) of the cable; and the market
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price of copper.
Project attributes aimed at approximating the equipment cost of a submarine power ca-
ble project included: the cable laying vessel used; the maximum depth along the submarine
route; and the application for which the cable will be used (island supply; grid interconnec-
tion; offshore wind power; bay/ lake/river crossing; or oil and gas offshore platform power
supply).
Market conditions for labor costs were approximated by the following project attributes:
country of project; manufacturer of the submarine cable; cable customer; contract year;
and estimated project length in years.
3.2.2 Data Transformation and Variable Selection
Finally, the contract cost for each submarine power cable project was converted to real
values in 2012 USD [91]. The natural logarithm of the cost is used as the dependent
variable in all models presented in Section 3.3, due to its normality. Modeling the cost data
as a Gamma distribution did not improve predictive performance.
As described in Section 3.3, many different statistical models were tested with different
combinations of the 21 aforementioned project attributes. Table 3.1 details the project
attributes, the inclusion of which resulted in the best prediction of project cost. The most
useful attributes from this perspective were eight continuous variables and three categorical
variables.
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Table 3.1: Submarine Power Cable Project Database
Independent Variables Mean Minimum Maximum
Continuous, Xi µi
Submarine cable route [km] 94.1 2.20 425
Maximum depth [m] 176 10.0 1,620
Number of cables 2.4 1.0 9.0
Cumulative length,
worldwide [km] 5,672 61.0 11,144
Market price,
copper [$2012 USD/ton] 10,576 2,471 13,983
Voltage [kV] 253 52.0 600
Project length [years] 3.43 1.00 6.00
Contract year [year] 2009 1998 2015
Independent Variables Number of Least Most
Categorical, Xi Levels Frequent Frequent
Country 27 Bahrain +15 Norway +1
(1)1 (8)
Application 5 Oil & Gas Island
Power Supply Supply
(6) (27)
AC/DC 3 AC/DC AC
(1) (39)
Dependent variable Mean Minimum Maximum
Yi µi
Cost [M$2012 USD] 216.8 15.00 1,240
Ln(Yi) 18.75 16.52 20.94
1 The number in parentheses represents the number of times the categorical level (or
levels, where indicated by “+" some number) appear(s) in the data.
3.3 Model Development and Selection
The primary research question of this work is to determine the best statistical model for
submarine power cable cost prediction. Industry insight on predictors was obtained through
conversations with industry representatives to determine which variables they believe af-
fect the cost of submarine cable projects. Using this insight, along with insights gained
from exploratory data analysis, various statistical models with different variable combina-
tions, were fit to the database. The statistical models initially explored included linear
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models, generalized linear models (GLM) with a gamma cost distribution, principal com-
ponent regression, generalized additive models (GAM), GAMs with model-based boosting
(mboost [92]) for optimized variable selection, bagged regression trees, random forests,
and multivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS). All models were trained and tested in
the R statistical programming environment, using the packages stats, mgcv, mboost,
randomForest, rpart, gbm and earth [93].
Models that performed well based on standard goodness-of-fit statistics and limited
predictive tests were selected for further study. The best performing models were then
subjected to predictive accuracy tests via Leave-One-Out-Cross-Validation (LOOCV) [94].
The final models are assessed via their predictive errors: absolute error (AE); and absolute
percent error (APE).
3.3.1 Linear Models
Three linear models were studied for use as baseline comparison models (Eqs. 3.1, 3.2 and
3.4). While model interpretability is not the focus of this study, it is essential to compare less
complex models with more complex models. If the less complex model can perform almost
as well as the more complex, the less complex may suffice in certain decision contexts.
This could be especially true in the planning/feasibility phase of a project, when not all the
technical project details are known, such as insulation choice, current type, or conductor
size. Thus, a model that can make accurate predictions based on the least number of inputs
is desirable. Such a model would also be advantageous for academics and policy analysts,
as these two groups do not typically have access to detailed input data.
Null Model
The null model is a linear model (Eq. 3.1) with an intercept and a normally distributed
error term, , with zero mean and finite variance, σ2, as described by N (0, σ2). With no
54
3.3. Model Development and Selection
predictors, the intercept is the unconditional expected mean of the response; as such, it
is often used as a baseline comparison to test whether input variables truly improve the
predictive accuracy of higher order models.
Y = β0 +  (3.1)
If higher order models do not perform better than the null model, then a simple mean
cost estimate could be used as the predicted cost of all future submarine power cable
projects. However, Table 3.4 shows that the best predictive models outperform the null.
Linear Model
Due to the lack of public data on submarine power cable projects, several consulting and
industry agencies have attempted to use limited project data to predict cost solely by
submarine route length [95][96]. As these models are based on only a limited number
of projects (16 [95]), the idea is tested here with a larger sample size (n=61). Eq. 3.2
represents the linear regression of submarine power cable cost based on X1, the length of
the submarine route (km), and the error term,  (N (0, σ2)).
Y = β0 + β1X1 +  (3.2)
Table 3.4 shows that this model does not predict submarine power cable costs well.
Econometric Learning Curve Model
A model of submarine power cable cost based on the theory of technological learning curves
was also explored. The basic idea behind learning curves is that implementing the project
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brings valuable lessons-learned, which reduce the cost of subsequent projects. A secondary
effect is that, as learning helps a firm improve performance and reduce cost, the firm
becomes more competitive in the market, in turn increasing overall competition, which
itself decreases cost [97][98].
The learning curve model developed for submarine power cables is specified in Eq. 3.3,
and is adapted from the most commonly used specification of the learning curve in energy
modeling [99]. The project cost, Ct, is based on the historical data for the cumulative
length, CLt, of submarine power cable that had been laid up to year, t. Using the database
described in Section 3.1, cumulative length was calculated based on the years 1998 to 2015.
In Eq. 3.3, δL is the shape of the curve representing the learning rate, δ0 is the cost of
the cable at a specific cumulative length, Nt is the number of cables laid in the project,
and Lt is the submarine route length. Economies of scale effects can be included using the
exponents δ1 and δ2, however, it was found that for this data set, the best cost prediction
occurs with δ1 and δ2 set equal to one. By taking the natural logarithm of Eq. 3.3, an
estimate of the learning rate can be calculated (Eq. 3.4), with the error term, t (N (0, σ2t )).
Ct = δ0N δ1t Lδ2t CLδLt (3.3)
lnCt = ln δ0 + δ1 lnNt + δ2 lnLt + δL lnCLt + t (3.4)
The standard representation of a learning rate (LR) is defined as LR = 1− 2δL , which
gives the change in cost after a doubling of cumulative cable length [100]. Under the
theoretical assumption that learning-by-doing leads to cost reductions, the learning rate,
LR, should be positive [99]. Modeling using Eq. 3.4 and the submarine power cable
database results in δL = −0.073, which represents an LR equal to 4.96%. That is, the
cost of a submarine power cable project will decrease by 4.96%, per doubling of cumulative
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length laid.
3.3.2 Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) Model
The desire for an accurate predictive model based on readily accessible data drives the model
development search to statistical learning models. The sophisticated algorithms behind
statistical learning models allow for less demanding data gathering efforts, as such models
can exploit potential non-linear relationships between the predictors and the dependent
variable. Though a well-performing predictive model still depends on highly relevant data,
these models typically require less ancillary data than econometric models, such as market
price data. Higher-order statistical learning models are oftentimes advantageous in this
respect, when such market data is commonly proprietary, and unavailable to energy system
modelers.
While many different statistical learning models were tested (see Section 3.3), the best
performing model was a MARS model [101]. The generic MARS model is formulated as in
Eq. 3.5, where X is a vector of predictor inputs, Xj for j = 1, 2, . . . , p, hm(X) are basis
functions dependent on the predictors’ discovered relationship with Y , and the error term,
 (N (0, σ2)).
Y = β0 +
M∑
m=1
βmhm(X) +  (3.5)
Basis functions allow for non-linear relationships between predictors and the dependent
variable. They take the general form hm(X) = (X − c)+, where + represents the positive
part of the linear basis function and zero otherwise, and c is the hinge point of the basis
function, or the product of two functions, when variable interactions are allowed.
The collection of possible basis functions is shown in Eq. 3.6, for each input Xj, with
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knots, c, possible at each observed value of that input, xij [94].
C =
{
(Xj − c)+, (c−Xj)+
}
c∈{x1j ,x2j ,...,xNj}
(3.6)
The best performing MARS model in terms of prediction contained the variables dis-
played in Eq. 3.7.
Y = 19.41− 0.0983(40− SubRoute)+
+ 0.0137(SubRoute− 40)+
− 0.0004(CumulLen− 3135)+
− 0.0035(300− V oltage)+
+ 0.4967(ConY ear − 2007)+
− 0.0001(3−NumCables)+ ∗ CuPrice
+ 0.0206(40− SubRoute)+ ∗ ProjLen
− 0.0094(SubRoute− 40)+ ∗DC (3.7)
The model allowing three degrees of variable interaction performed best in LOOCV
testing, with 8 out of 9 predictors utilized. The final model is specified in Eq. 3.7. The
last three basis functions are multiplied by the linear predictors, CuPrice, ProjLen, and
DC cable type, respectively.
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Table 3.2: Prediction Error by Model
AE APE AE APE
[Ln($2012 USD)] [%] [Million$2012 USD] [%]
µ σ min max µ σ min max µ σ min max µ σ min max
Null 0.81 0.61 0.022 2.3 4.34 3.36 0.12 13.7 Null 142 193 2.45 1,106 117 166 2.16 864
Linear 0.67 0.45 0.037 1.8 3.63 2.54 0.19 10.9 Linear 121 131 4.78 529 85.9 103 3.63 509
Econometric 0.55 0.43 0.025 2.2 3.00 2.33 0.13 11.4 Econometric 106 134 2.83 623 62.5 61.9 2.57 254
MARS 0.54 0.40 0.008 1.4 2.89 2.13 0.043 7.42 MARS 111 170 0.982 933 59.0 58.6 0.80 249
3.4 Results - Model Predictive Accuracy
3.4.1 Mean Prediction
The models in Section 3.3 were tested for predictive accuracy using LOOCV. This allows
the distribution of model errors to be evaluated, the results of which are presented in Table
3.4.
Table 3.4 shows that the MARS model has better predictive accuracy on the log scale
than the Econometric learning curve model, out-performing the latter in both mean absolute
error (MAE) and mean absolute percent error (MAPE). When the results are transformed
back to the original dollar scale, however, the Econometric Learning Curve model performs
slightly better than the MARS in the AE metrics, though the standard deviation of the
MARS AE is much better than the Econometric. Which model would better serve a
particular practitioner will depend on which error metric is more important to him or her.
3.4.2 Probabilistic Prediction
While the distribution of absolute and absolute percent errors from testing gives a sense of
the predictive power of the model, it does not give any information about the uncertainty
associated with a specific point prediction. The models presented in Section 3.3 output
mean-value predictions. These predictions represent an expected value considering a prob-
ability density function for the error, which has been assumed to be Gaussian, of the form
Y ∼ N (0, σ2).
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Using the vector of residuals obtained from testing the models on the data set, a
normal distribution is fit, with the standard deviation determined from the fitted curve.
The standard deviation from the residual curve is then applied to the mean-value estimates
from the prediction model, giving the full uncertainty distribution around the prediction.
This method can be applied to any statistical learning model from which residuals can be
calculated.
To compare the errors between models that output probability density predictions, the
normal methods of MAE and MAPE do not apply. One applicable method is the continuous
ranked probability score (CRPS) [102]. The CRPS compares the probability distribution of
the prediction to the probability distribution of the observed data value, as in Eq. 3.8, via
the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of each (Eq. 3.9).
CRPS = CRPS(F, xa) =
∫ ∞
−∞
[F (x)− Fa(x)]2dx (3.8)
and where, F and Fa are cumulative distribution functions:
F (x) =
∫ x
−∞
ρ(y)dy
Fa(x) = H(x− xa), (3.9)
where Eq. 3.10 is the Heaviside function,
H(x) =

0 for x < 0
1 for x ≥ 0
(3.10)
Thus, the CRPS measures the difference between the predicted and actual CDFs. This
is true even for the case when the actual observation is a single value, where the CDF is
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represented as a single step function from zero to one at the observed value.
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of probabilistic error results by CRPS, in terms of direct comparison of
model output (Ln(ConCost)), and the exponentially transformed model output, which gives cost
in familiar units of $2012 USD.
Fig. 3.1 shows a clear shift left of the CRPS for the MARS model, illustrating a better
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distribution of probabilistic errors, compared to the Linear and Null models. Compared to
the Econometric model, the CRPS for the MARS has a much shorter right tail. Fig. 3.1
shows the same for the dollar values of the errors, with the maximum MARS CRPS an
order of magnitude smaller than the other models. This order of magnitude decrease in
error is extremely valuable for decision-makers.
3.4.3 Model Limitations
While the best performing model, MARS, clearly outperforms the baseline Linear and Null
models, the error distributions could be closer to zero. Hundreds of statistical learning
models were tested with the data set on-hand, which leads the authors to recognize that
other, more predictively powerful explanatory variables for submarine power cable cost may
exist, beyond the scope of this data set. One variable that could not be collected for a
sufficient number of projects was the cross-sectional area (mm2) of the conductor core
per cable. In conversations with industry representatives, it emerged that this might be
a valuable piece of information to approximate material cost. The best data that could
be acquired from the public domain was the global market price of copper. However, this
variable might be neither the only, nor the best, to aid in predicting cost. As with all large
infrastructure projects, there are many factors that contribute to the uncertainty of the
final cost. It is hypothesized that any single new variable will bring only a modest decrease
in model errors.
3.5 Case Study
The two best-performing predictive models - MARS and Econometric Learning Curve - are
applied to a case study described below. The analysis shows that the probabilistic prediction
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Table 3.3: Reduction of EENS (MWh) and Risk Cost [M$] Due to Replacing the Cable [9]
Failure Year Reduction of Cost of risk Cost of risk
of Cable EENS (MWh) reduction reduction, by
[M$2006 CAN] [M$2012 USD]
2006 1,957 6.008 6.986
2007 718 2.204 2.563
2008 450 1.382 1.607
2009 214 0.657 0.763
gives more valuable information to the decision-maker than the single, mean-value point
estimate does.
3.5.1 Problem Description
The submarine power cable system that connects Vancouver Island, British Columbia,
Canada to the mainland was chosen for the case study. In 2007, Li et al. developed a
risk-based approach to assess different cable replacement strategies. It probabilistically as-
sessed the risks of cable failure to the power system, by calculating the expected energy not
supplied (EENS) [9], which is one of the most important reliability indices in transmission
expansion planning [61]. However, uncertainty in the cost estimate of the replacement
cable is not considered. The cost of replacing the submarine power cable is estimated as $8
million CAN 2006, which is $9,298,653 USD 2012. Table 3.3 replicates the results reported
in Li et al.’s Tables IX [9], and updates the cost data to 2012 real values in USD [91].
The final two columns in Table 3.3 represent the value of the benefit to the system;
column three with the original 2006 cost data, while column four is updated to 2012 USD
real values. Li et al. divide this benefit value by the estimated cost of the cable replacement,
$8 million CAN 2006, to get a benefit/cost ratio. If the benefits outweigh the costs, i.e.,
the benefit/cost ratio is greater than one, then the advised strategy is cable replacement.
The dynamics of system upgrades makes this case study particularly relevant. While the
overall risk to the system is predicted to decrease over time due to other system upgrades,
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Table 3.4: Vancouver Island Cable Cost Prediction Data
Predictors
NumCables SubRoute CumulativeLength Voltage ProjLen CuPrice ConYear AC/DC
[km] [km] [kV] [Years] [$2012 USD/ton]
2006 1 5 2,088 300 1 10,653 2006 DC
2007 1 5 2,588 300 1 11,281 2007 DC
2008 1 5 3,135 300 1 11,024 2008 DC
2009 1 5 3,625 300 1 8,127 2009 DC
it is never predicted to be nil. Even this relatively short (5 km) system component could
play a big role in reducing system risk. The ultimate decision of whether or not to reduce
system risk even further, by replacing the cable, is equally dependent on the cost estimate
of the cable replacement, as it is on the estimate of risk reduction. Therefore, emphasis on
careful study into cost estimation is just as important as the analysis of system risk.
3.5.2 Probabilistic Model Application
The cost of the Vancouver Island cable replacement is probabilistically estimated using both
the MARS model and the Econometric Learning Curve model described in Section 3.3. The
data used for prediction is from the British Columbia Transmission Company (BCTC) [103],
with all predictor values falling within the range of the training data used to develop the
model (see Table 3.1).
Assuming a normal distribution, the cost estimate (µy) and the standard deviation (σy)
(see Table 3.5) have been derived from the testing residuals of the respective model, as
discussed in Section 3.4.2.
3.5.3 Uncertainty Analysis and Risk Measures
The decision-making framework for cable replacement, as presented by [9], is a benefit/cost
analysis. The cable cost estimate can inform decision-makers in either a deterministic or
probabilistic way. The decision analysis with deterministic information, i.e. when only the
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Table 3.5: Probabilistic Cost Prediction of Vancouver Island Cable
MARS Econometric
Year Mean, µy σy Mean, µy σy
Ln([M$2012 USD]) Ln([M$2012 USD])
2006 15.56 0.6657 15.75 0.6975
2007 15.49 0.6657 15.73 0.6975
2008 16.01 0.6657 15.72 0.6975
2009 16.62 0.6657 15.71 0.6975
Table 3.6: Deterministic and Probabilistic Analyses
MARS Deterministic Uncertainty Analysis & Probabilistic Risk Measures
Failure Year Benefit/Cost BCy BCy
of Cable, y ratio, BCy P (BCy ≥ 1) VaR CVaR
2006 1.22 61.7% 0.52 0.36
2007 0.48 13.4% 0.20 0.14
2008 0.18 0.47% 0.07 0.05
2009 0.05 0.0002% 0.02 0.01
Econometric Deterministic Uncertainty Analysis & Probabilistic Risk Measures
Failure Year Benefit/Cost BCy BCy
of Cable, y ratio, BCy P (BCy ≥ 1) VaR CVaR
2006 1.01 50.6% 0.41 0.28
2007 0.38 8.08% 0.15 0.11
2008 0.24 2.02% 0.10 0.07
2009 0.11 0.096% 0.05 0.03
mean cost estimate is presented to the decision-maker, is shown in Table 3.6. Using Li et
al.’s calculations of the benefit per year (see Table 3.3), the benefit/cost ratio is calculated.
Given only a point estimate of cost, a decision-maker would choose to replace the cable if
the benefit/cost ratio is greater than one. As seen in Table 3.6, this occurs only in the first
year, 2006.
Because the cost of the cable investment is large and irreversible, in such a setting
it is natural to consider the variability in cost, in addition to the deterministic, average
cost; namely, through mean-risk formulations. These formulations have two important
benefits: they require only two moments, which can be estimated, and they provide useful
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recommendations [104].
We illustrate these analysis possibilities with three different types of risk measures: a
probability - the probability that the cost is higher than the benefit, i.e., that the bene-
fit/cost ratio is lower than one; a quantile - the 90% value-at-risk (VaR), i.e., the minimum
benefit/cost ratio likely to happen with a 90% probability; and a tail expectation - the 90%
conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR), i.e., the expected value of the 10% worst benefit/cost
ratios.
Using the full distribution of the cable cost estimate, the probability that the benefit/cost
ratio, BCy, will be greater than one is given in Eq. 3.11. This is determined by calculating
the probability that the cost is less than or equal to the benefit value in that year by, where
y is the year of cable failure. This is according to the probability density function (Eq. 3.11)
of the log-normal random variable cost estimate, Xy, where µy is the mean cost estimate,
σy is the standard deviation of the cost estimate, and by is the value of the benefit. This
calculation gives the probability that the cost estimate would equal the benefit, making the
benefit/cost ratio at least one. The results are shown in column three (P (BCy ≥ 1)) of
Table 3.6.
P (Xy ≤ by) =
∫ by
−∞
1√
2piσyby
e−(ln(by)−µy)
2/2σ2y ∀y (3.11)
A quantile risk measure often used by decision-makers, termed Value-at-Risk (VaR) and
given by Eq. 3.12, calculates the value of the random variable (i.e. the submarine cable
cost estimate) at the desired q-quantile.
V aR(q) = exp(µy + σyΦ−1(q)) ∀y (3.12)
66
3.5. Case Study
The results shown in column four of Table 3.6 were calculated at the 90th percentile of
the cost. These results tell the decision-maker that, for example, according to the MARS
model in the year 2006, with 90% probability the benefit/cost ratio will be higher than 0.52.
Thus, the risk of a benefit/cost ratio below 0.52 is very low. Using the VaR risk metric
gives the decision-maker not only the value of a worse-than-expected benefit/cost ratio,
but the variability of the cost distribution. A very risk averse decision-maker may decide
that, even though the expected benefit/cost ratio is significantly greater than one, the VaR
of 0.52 is too far from the expected, and too low, to go ahead with the investment. It is
left to the decision-maker to assess what value of risk s/he is willing to take on.
A third risk metric, a tail-expectation termed the Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR),
is also calculated. CVaR measures the expected value of the cost random variable at the
specified tail of the distribution. The BCy CVaR results given in column five of Table 3.6
are again at the q = 90th percentile of cost.
CV aR(q) = e
µy+σ2y/2
1− q (1− Φ(Φ
−1(q)− σy)) ∀y (3.13)
As shown in Eq. 3.13, CVaR calculates the expected value of the 10% worst cost
estimates, which are, in terms of this case study, the expected value of the 10% highest
costs. Thus, the CVaR calculated here gives the risk of a significantly lower-than-expected
benefit/cost ratio. For example, in 2006, the Econometric model gives a 90% BCy CVaR
equal to 0.28; an extremely risk-averse decision-maker may find the risk of such a low ben-
efit/cost ratio unacceptable, even though the mean benefit/cost ratio indicates a favorable
cost.
Both VaR and CVaR present the decision-maker with information about the tail of
the probability distribution, or what might happen in an extreme case. Along with the
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probability of the benefit/cost ratio being greater than one (P (BCy ≥ 1)), information
about the uncertainty associated with the cost estimate provides added value to the decision-
maker. Risk metrics are such an important tool in decision-making that recent research is
bringing them directly into the optimization problem [105][106].
3.6 Conclusion
A well-performing model for early cost prediction of submarine cable projects has been
developed. While the model framework, MARS, is a complex statistical learning model, the
data input needed to make a prediction is publicly available. Where decision contexts do
not demand the precision accuracy given by the MARS model, the Econometric learning
curve model, with less input data, may suffice as reasonably accurate.
Both models output the uncertainty around the predicted cost value, giving decision-
makers the ability to calculate risks and assess investment decisions based on those risks.
The cost prediction models developed give valuable information to decision-makers in in-
dustry, policy analysis and academia, when cost estimation is an integral component of
alternatives assessment.
68
3.7. Addendum
3.7 Addendum
3.7.1 Probabilistic Prediction Normality Assumption
The graph below illustrates the applicability of the normality assumption of the probabilistic
prediction in Section 3.4, comparing the residuals of the MARS model to a standard normal
distribution.
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Figure 3.2: Verificiation of normal probabilistic prediction assumption.
While both left and right tails appear, general adherence to the zero deviation line
demonstrates that the assumption of a normal distribution is reasonable.
3.7.2 Future Work
The basic idea behind learning curves is that, as experience is gained in the market in de-
ploying a technology such as subsea power cables, competition between suppliers intensifies
which reduces cost [97][98]. Learning curve models are routinely utilized within larger en-
ergy system models in the United States (US) [107] and the European Union (EU) [108], as
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well as in climate change integrated-assessment models (IAM) [109]. The assumptions of
both learning curve specifications and exogenously utilized learning rates can dramatically
affect overall model results, as in [108], where fast-learning assumptions resulted in almost
five times the GDP gain in the EU when compared to no-learning. It is imperative to use
accurately specified learning curve models, as the overall results of these bottom-up en-
ergy and climate change models are often the basis of federal, European Union-level policy
designs.
An interesting avenue of future work in this area would be to build statistical learning
models for other energy generation technologies (i.e. wind, offshore wind, biogas, etc.), and
compare cost predictions against their corresponding technological learning curve models.
This would verify if the technological learning curves currently being employed in climate
change models are resulting in reasonable investment strategies and policy recommenda-
tions.
70
Chapter 4
Complementarity modeling of
Renewable Energy Credit (REC) and
electricity markets to inform effective
renewable energy policy formation
Across the United States (U.S.), at least 2,650 renewable energy incentives and regulations
exist at the state level. The most common overarching policy instrument is the Renew-
able Portfolio Standard (RPS), also known as a Renewable Energy Target (RET), which
mandates that a certain percentage of electricity be produced from renewable energy. The
highest targets in the U.S. are currently 100% renewable energy production in Hawaii by
2045, and 50% in both California and Oregon by 2030 and 2040, respectively. While the
overarching goal of increasing renewable energy production is common among policies, the
mechanisms for achieving a given RET vary widely. This study is one of the first to analyze
whether an RET is best set as a single or multi-stage goal; at the state level (regionally), or
This chapter is based on Schell et al. [110].
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at the firm-level; and whether the mechanism of trading the environmental benefits of re-
newable energy via Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) aids RET achievement. By modeling
both the REC and electricity market, this study finds that an RET policy design of multi-
stage targets at the firm-level, without an REC market, is optimal. It not only achieves the
highest social surplus, but also the highest renewable investment, as well as the greatest
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
4.1 Introduction
Policies that incentivize renewable energy have become so commonplace that the U.S. De-
partment of Energy has established a center for tracking policy updates, titled the Database
of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency [22]. Across the U.S., at least 2,650 re-
newable energy incentives and regulations exist at the state level.
Despite the prevalence of policies that increase the use of renewable energy in the United
States, few studies have examined potential policy interference, whether constructive or
destructive [111][112]. Even less research has evaluated whether these policies individually,
or collectively, are producing the desired results, and at what cost [15][113][35]. Fewer still
have been conducted to determine if the predominant policy in most states - an RET - is
the best instrument to achieve the primary climate change mitigation goal of greenhouse
gas emissions reduction. For example, Bird et al. [30] have shown that, at the federal
level, a policy of a greenhouse gas emissions target, known as a carbon cap, results in more
investment in renewable energy, with higher emissions reductions, and at a lower cost, than
either a cap-and-trade policy, an RET policy, or a combination of the two.
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4.1.1 Complementarity Modeling for Policy Analysis
With the increasing complexity of electricity markets, “it will be harder to accurately gauge
the effects of proposed regulations, policies, or other inputs without tools like” comple-
mentarity modeling [114]. Complementarity models allow the representation of several
optimiziation problems (such as each individual electricity producer’s problem of profit
maximization) to be solved jointly with the clearing of the wholesale electricity and ancil-
lary markets. Thus, the main advantage of complementarity models is that both primal and
dual decision variables can be directly manipulated. In terms of electricity markets, primal
variables refer to the technical decisions, such as how much electricity to produce from a
certain generating unit, and which units to invest in or expand. Complementarity model
formulations also allow for the dual variables in electricity market optimization models - the
prices - to be manipulated [114].
Over the past decade, complementarity modeling has been essential for modeling dereg-
ulated electricity markets, which are characterized by an increasing number of agents. For
example, Hobbs [115] showed the equivalence of bilateral contracts to pooled electric-
ity markets, and this provided the basis for merger evaluations and market power studies
[116][117], transmission congestion effects [118][119] and renewable energy policy evalua-
tion [120][121].
4.1.2 Complementarity Modeling for Renewable Energy Policy Anal-
ysis
Recent work with complementarity modeling of electricity systems, markets and regulation
has focused largely on the effect of carbon cap-and-trade regulations versus carbon taxa-
tion. He et al. [120] show that a cap-and-trade policy is equivalent to a uniform carbon tax,
when banking of allowances is permitted. However, a combination of a carbon tax and sub-
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sidies could be more efficient than a carbon tax alone. For the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), an example of carbon cap-and-trade regulation, Bonenti et al.
[122] find that strategic generation companies can increase their profits, despite increasing
carbon allowance prices. While renewable energy policy is not modeled explicitly, they deter-
mined that renewable energy policies or incentives would be needed to force investment and
expansion in renewable energy in Italy. Without a policy that incentivized renewables, gen-
erating firms preferred and prioritized expansion investment in combined-cycle gas turbines
(CCGT), which emits slightly less greenhouse gas (GHGs) than traditional fossil fuels.
Others have utilized complementarity models to analyze both carbon and renewable
energy policies. Linares et al. [3] find that an RET policy actually indirectly reduces
electricity prices. By increasing the share of renewable energy generation, the carbon
allowance price is reduced, and so also is the electricity price. Further, they find that a
carbon cap-and-trade policy by itself cannot stimulate much renewable energy investment
in the Spanish electricity system; an RET is needed in order to achieve this goal.
Similarly, Chen and Wang [121] model carbon cap-and-trade policy in conjunction with
RET policy and voluntary green pricing of renewable electricity. While their model takes
into account the operational and transmission constraints of the electricity system, they do
not model the possibility of renewable energy expansion, and thus do not fully account for
the effect of RET policies on the market. Analyzing various policy formulations for RETs
and green pricing premiums, it was found that the social surplus is highest when renewable
energy production is allowed to count towards an RET, as well as sold as green power.
Fewer studies have employed complementarity modeling solely for renewable energy
policy analysis. Siddiqi et al. [123] analyzed the difference that market structure (i.e.
such as centrally planned, perfectly competitive and a Cournot oligopoly) makes on the
endogenous determination of an optimal RET. Although neither the production nor the
transmission system technical constraints are accounted for, it was concluded that the type
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of market structure must be considered when policymakers regulate RETs, or substantial
welfare loss could occur.
4.1.3 Paper Aims and Structure
This study is one of the first to use complementarity modeling to analyze RET policy
formation. It investigates whether it ought to be a single goal, or one that is increasingly
stringent over time. It also explores whether it should be set at the regional or the firm-level,
and how the mechanism of trading the environmental benefits of renewable energy - via
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) - impacts RET achievement and the broader social goals
of renewable energy policy. In Section 4.2, we discuss our complementarity model in detail.
Section ?? presents our results, and Section ?? both summarizes the main outcomes and
explores policy implications.
4.2 Methods
A market equilibrium model is employed to represent the interaction of market agents, the
electricity market and the renewable energy credit market [114]. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the
interaction of the strategic generating firms’ profit maximization problem, which is subject
to technical constraints, with the clearing of the electricity and renewable energy credit
markets.
The market equilibrium problem can be presented as a mixed linear complementarity
problem (MCP) via the expression of each firm’s optimization problem as its corresponding
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions, along with the market clearing equations. Solving
this system of equations simultaneously gives the equilibrium solution to the problem.
The sets, parameters and variables of the MCP model are presented below.
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Optimization Problem of
Generating Firm 1
maximize Π(x1)
s.t. h1 = 0 g1 ≤ 0
. . .
Optimization Problem of
Generating Firm G
maximize Π(xG)
s.t. hG = 0 gG ≤ 0
pelec = felec(x)
Electricity Market
pREC = fREC(x)
Renewable Energy
Credit Market
Figure 4.1: Schematic of the market equilibrium problem, adapted from [3].
Table 4.1: Model sets, parameters and variables
Sets Description
I set of nodes i, j ∈ I
L set of transmission lines l ∈ L
B set of load blocks b ∈ B
F set of generating firms f, g ∈ F
H set of generating units h ∈ H
T set of time periods t ∈ T
Parameters Description Units
Cfih generator f ’s marginal cost of technology h at node i [$/MWh]
Ifih generator f ’s investment cost of technology h at node i [$/MW]
K0fih initial capacity of technology h at node i owned by generator f [MW]
Kmaxfih maximum capacity expansion of technology h at node i owned by generator f [MW]
CFfih capacity factor of technology h at node i owned by generator f [%]
REh renewable classification of technology h [0/1]
Bhb availability of technology h for demand block b [0/1]
Db duration of load block b [hours]
P 0itb price intercept at node i in time t and demand block b [$/MWh]
Q0itb quantity intercept at node i in time t and demand block b [MW]
PTDFil power transmission distribution factor, node i to interface l dimensionless
Tl maximum capacity of power flows through line l [MW]
RETt renewable energy target in time t [%]
β discount factor dimensionless
M sufficiently large number dimensionless
Decision Variables Description Units
xfihtb production of generator f ’s technology h at node i in time t and demand block b [MW]
Kfiht total capacity expansion of technology h at node i in time t owned by generator f [MW]
sfitb sales from generator f at node i in time t at demand block b [MW]
rft renewable energy credits (RECs) purchased by generator f in time t [MWh]
aRECft renewable energy production sold as a REC, by generator f in time t [MWh]
aft renewable energy production not sold as a REC, by generator f in time t [MWh]
yitb power injected at node i in time t and demand block b [MW]
Market Clearing Dual Variables Description Units
witb payment from generator f to send power from generation nodei to consumption node j [$/MWh]
pRECt price of renewable energy credit (REC) at time t [$/MWh]
Dual Variables Description Units
θftb dual variables for constraint 4.2 [$/MW]
ρfiht dual variables for constraint 4.3 [$/MW]
γfiht dual variables for constraint 4.4 [$/MW]
µfihtb dual variables for constraint 4.5 [$/MW]
δft dual variables for constraint 4.6 [$/MWh]
ηft dual variables for constraint 4.7 [$/MWh]
λ+ltb dual variables for constraint 4.10 [$/MWh]
λ−ltb dual variables for constraint 4.11 [$/MWh]
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4.2.1 Generating Firm’s Problem
Each generating firm is modeled as a strategic producer, vying to maximize its own profit.
We assume that each firm knows the inverse demand curve of the entire market and uses
this knowledge to assess how a change in its own production would affect the equilibrium
price of electricity. Here, the inverse demand curve is further specified per node, time
period and demand block (see Eq. 4.1). Under the Cournot assumption, each generating
firm assumes fixed values of production for the other firms (all sgitb for g 6= f). This is
coupled with the Nash extension that each firm assumes the others’ production decisions
are beyond its control, resulting in a Nash-Cournot equilibrium [115].
Each generating firm’s problem is formulated as a generation expansion planning (GEP)
problem, allowing the firm to invest in new generation capacity (Eq. 4.3) if it is either
profitable or necessary to meet a renewable energy target (RET) (Eq. 4.7). The first term
in the firm’s objective function (Eq. 4.1) calculates the firm’s profit from electricity sales,
minus the cost of transmission; the second term subtracts the marginal cost of generation
from the firm’s profit, but adds transmission revenue; the third and fourth terms subtract
investment cost in new generation, as well as the cost of any renewable energy credit (REC)
purchases to meet an RET.
Eq. 4.2 balances the sales of electricity to all nodes with actual production. Eq. 4.3
ensures electricity production is less than total capacity, times a capacity factor, CFfih.
This capacity factor incorporates the variability associated with renewable energy resources,
as well as the expected down-time of fossil fuel generators for maintenance and repairs.
max
∑
jtb
βt−1Db
[
P 0jtb −
P 0jtb
Q0jtb
(∑
g
sgjtb
)
− wjtb
]
sfjtb −
∑
ihtb
βt−1Db [Cfiht − witb]xfihtb
(4.1)
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−∑
iht
βt−1IfihKfiht −
∑
t
βt−1pRECt rft
s. t.
∑
j
sfjtb =
∑
ih
xfihtb (θftb) ∀t, b (4.2)
xfihtb ≤ (K0fih +
t−1∑
τ=1
Kfihτ )CFfih (ρfihtb) ∀i, h, t, b (4.3)
∑
t
Kfiht ≤ Kmaxfih (γfih) ∀i, h (4.4)
xfihtb ≤ BhbM (µfihtb) ∀i, h, t, b (4.5)
aft + aRECft =
∑
ihb
Db REh xfihtb (δft) ∀t (4.6)
aft + rft ≥ RETft(
∑
ihb
Dbxfihtb) (ηft) ∀t (4.7)
sfitb, xfihtb, Kfiht, aft, rft ≥ 0 ∀i, h, t, b (4.8)
Generation capacity expansion is limited by both estimates of natural resource avail-
ability and available siting area (Eq. 4.4). Further, each generating unit is limited by its
availability to reasonably serve a load type (Eq. 4.5). For example, intermittent wind
cannot be used to meet baseload demand.
The sale of renewable energy credits is tracked by variable rft, while the production of
renewable energy expressly for the purpose of being put into the REC market is tracked
by variable aRECft . Equation 4.6 ensures that there is no double-counting: the renewable
energy produced and used by the firm itself (aft) is not available for sale as RECs (aRECft ).
The RET policy described in the model presented here (Eq. 4.7) represents a firm-level
attribution of a renewable target. This model specification corresponds to Scenarios 1c and
3c, which are further elaborated upon in Section 4.2.
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4.2.2 Transmission System Operator’s (TSO) Problem
The grid owner (TSO) is assumed to be a price-taker for the cost of transmission services,
witb. The TSO maximizes profit by maximizing the amount of power transmitted through
the grid (yitb).
max
∑
itb
witbyitb (4.9)
s. t.
∑
i
PTDFilyitb ≤ Tl (λ+ltb) ∀l, t, b (4.10)
−∑
i
PTDFilyitb ≤ Tl (λ−ltb) ∀l, t, b (4.11)
(4.12)
Transmission through the grid is subject to: the specific network topology; the physical
constraints of Kirchhoff’s laws, via the Power Transfer Distribution Factor matrix (PTDF);
as well as the capacity limits on the transmission lines (Tl) [124].
4.2.3 Market Clearing
In addition to simultaneously solving the Generating Firm’s and the TSO’s optimization
problems, the following market clearing conditions must also simultaneously be met:
∑
f
aRECft ≥
∑
f
rft (pRECt ) ∀t (4.13)
yitb =
∑
f
sfitb −
∑
fh
xfihtb (witb) ∀i, t, b (4.14)
The REC market clearing equation, Eq. 4.13, requires that the total amount of RECs
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sold in the market cannot exceed the total amount of renewable energy actually produced,
for that purpose. The dual variable of this equation gives the market price of an REC. Eq.
4.2 ensures equilibrium in the electricity market when the TSO’s power injection decision
is balanced with all firms’ decisions on sales (sfitb) and power (xfihtb) (Eq. 4.14).
4.2.4 Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Optimality Conditions
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions of all generating firms’ optimization prob-
lems, together with the TSO optimization problem, represent the necessary and sufficient
conditions for a market equilibrium. These are outlined in Eqs. 4.15 - 4.31 below.
0 ≤ sfjtb ⊥ −βt−1Db
[
P 0jtb −
P 0jtb
Q0jtb
(
sfjtb +
∑
g
sgjtb
)
− wjtb
]
+ θftb ≥ 0 ∀f, i, t, b
(4.15)
0 ≤ xfihtb ⊥ βt−1Db (Cfiht − witb)− θftb + ρfihtb (4.16)
+ µfihtb +Db(δftREh + ηftRETft) ≥ 0 ∀f, i, h, t, b
0 ≤ Kfiht ⊥ βt−1Ifih − CFfih(
∑
b
T∑
τ=t+1
ρfihτb) + γfih ≥ 0 ∀f, i, h, t (4.17)
∑
i
sfitb =
∑
ih
xfihtb ∀f, t, b (4.18)
0 ≤ ρfihtb ⊥ CFfih(K0fih +
t−1∑
τ=1
Kfihτ )− xfihtb ≥ 0 ∀f, i, h, t, b (4.19)
0 ≤ γfih ⊥ Kmaxfiht −
∑
t
Kfiht ≥ 0 ∀f, i, h (4.20)
0 ≤ µfihtb ⊥ BhbM − xfihtb ≥ 0 ∀f, i, h, t, b (4.21)
0 ≤ pRECt ⊥
∑
f
aRECft −
∑
f
rft ≥ 0 ∀t (4.22)
aft + aRECft =
∑
ihb
DbREhxfihtb ∀f, t (4.23)
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0 ≤ aRECft ⊥ −δft − pRECt ≥ 0 ∀f, t (4.24)
0 ≤ aft ⊥ −δft − ηft ≥ 0 ∀f, t (4.25)
0 ≤ ηft ⊥ aft + rft −RETft(
∑
ihb
Dbxfihtb) ≥ 0 ∀f, t (4.26)
0 ≤ rft ⊥ βt−1pRECt − ηft + pRECt ≥ 0 ∀f, t (4.27)
witb = −
∑
l
PTDFil(λ−ltb − λ+ltb) ∀i, t, b (4.28)
0 ≤ λ+ltb ⊥ Tl −
∑
i
PTDFilyitb ≥ 0 ∀l, t, b (4.29)
0 ≤ λ−ltb ⊥ Tl +
∑
i
PTDFilyitb ≥ 0 ∀l, t, b (4.30)
yitb =
∑
f
sfitb −
∑
fh
xfihtb ∀i, t, b (4.31)
4.2.5 Scenarios
The base model described in Sections 4.2.1 - 4.2.4 depicts an electricity market faced with
a mandatory renewable energy target (RET) policy. In order to facilitate achievement of
this policy goal at least cost to all market participants (producers, TSOs and consumers),
the regulators have introduced an REC market. A producer may choose to buy an REC
in lieu of investing in or producing from its own renewable energy generation. Whether or
not the introduction of this REC market would increase social welfare is one of the main
research questions of this study.
We address the efficiency of an REC market through the analysis of eight different RET
policy scenarios. These scenarios are outlined in Table 4.2 below. They are broadly defined
by three characteristics: 1) whether the renewable energy target is a single, ambitious
one to be met in the future, or a series of increasingly stringent targets; 2) whether an
REC market is in place to facilitate RET achievement; and, 3) whether the RET must
be achieved collectively at a regional level, or individually at the firm-level. Analyzing the
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market outcomes of these eight scenarios will highlight the tradeoffs between the eight
different policy designs.
Table 4.2: Description of model scenarios.
RET - single goal RET - multiple goals
REC market No REC market REC market No REC market
Regional 1a 1b 3a 3b
Firm-level 1c 1d 3c 3d
Mathematically, specifying these different scenarios requires slight changes to the RET
and REC market clearing equations (Eqs. 4.7 and 4.13). These changes are enumerated in
B.1.
4.2.6 Case Study and Data
The model, modified for the eight scenarios in Table 4.2, is applied to a case study of the
Azores Islands, a Portuguese archipelago in the mid-North Atlantic. To make model results
tractable, only two islands are studied (São Miguel and Santa Maria), over a load duration
curve divided into three blocks (base, middle and peak), for a time period of ten years
(2015, 2020 and 2025).
We model the islands as linked with a single submarine power cable so that renewable
production on one island can be sold to the other. The transmission line is assumed to have
unlimited capacity. Each island is modeled as one firm, and has generation capabilities only
on its own node (i.e. f equals i in this case study). São Miguel island, the largest in the
archipelago, correspondingly has the highest population with the highest demand. It is also
endowed with the most exploitable geothermal resources. Santa Maria island has 4.6% of
the demand of São Miguel, but has reasonable wind resources.
This case study represents an application of the model to a two-node network with
unlimited transmission capacity, and the ability of both firms to invest in more renewable
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generation. It is not meant to, nor does it, represent the actual situation of the market on
the Azores Islands.
Table 4.3: Data. The cost data is from ERSE [5], the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) [6], and the
International Energy Agency (IEA) [7].
K0fih K
max
fih CFfih Invfih Cfih REh Bhb
[MW] [MW] [%] [$/MW] [$/MWh]
f1 f2 f1 f2 f1 f2 Base Middle Peak
Wind 0 0.9 18.3 0.6 29.3 32.9 261,000 90 1 0 1 0
Offshore Wind 0 0 50 50 31.3 34.9 562,000 49 1 0 1 0
Hydropower 5.03 0 6.75 0 40.0 40.0 615,000 90 1 0 1 0
Geothermal 27.8 0 47.7 0 72.1 72.1 397,000 22 1 1 0 0
Solar 0 0 50 50 11.6 11.6 569,000 325 1 0 1 0
Wave 0 0 50 50 30.0 30.0 629,000 50 1 0 1 0
Diesel 0 5.68 50 50 79.1 79.1 130,000 42 0 1 1 1
Fuel Oil 98.1 0 50 50 79.1 79.1 137,000 43 0 1 1 1
Biogas 0 0 12.8 0.53 79.1 79.1 574,000 80 1 1 1 1
Table 4.3 shows the current generation capacity, as well as the natural expansion and
production limits per generation technology and island. The same table also shows the
investment and operating costs by technology type; in this case study, the costs are the
same for both firms. The islands are distinguished as f1 and f2 (firm 1 and firm 2) for São
Miguel and Santa Maria, respectively.
Table A.2 gives the demand data per island via the inverse demand curve.
Table 4.4: Data. Inverse Demand Function.
P 0itb Q
0
itb
[$/MW] [MW]
f1 f2 f1 f2
2015 Base 563 1,171 0.56 1.17
Middle 923 1,920 0.92 1.92
Peak 1,013 2,108 1.01 2.11
2020 Base 621 1,293 0.62 1.29
Middle 1,019 2,120 1.02 2.12
Peak 1,118 2,327 1.12 2.33
2025 Base 686 1,427 0.69 1.43
Middle 1,125 2,341 1.12 2.34
Peak 1,234 2,569 1.23 2.57
The RET profile we employ throughout this study is summarized in Table 4.5. When
an RET is designed as a single goal, it is set at 75% in 2025.
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Table 4.5: Data. Renewable energy target (RET).
Time RET
Period [%]
2015 20
2020 40
2025 75
4.3 Results
The model results for each scenario described in Section 4.2 are analyzed with respect to
the overarching policy goals of incentivizing new renewable energy investment, decreas-
ing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and increasing economic efficiency. These results,
presented in Tables 4.6 - 4.12, are discussed in this section.
4.3.1 RET Achievement: Renewable Energy Investment vs. REC
Trading
The highest investment in renewable energy occurs in Scenarios 1d and 3d, when the
RET is set at the firm-level and there is no REC market. The increased renewable energy
investment in these scenarios is driven by compounding factors: 1) because the RET is set
at the firm-level, each firm must meet an RET; and 2) because there is no REC market, the
RET must be met by each firm, using either existing or new renewable energy production.
In all scenarios, the new renewable investment comes from Firm 2 (Santa Maria), which
does not have enough existing renewable energy generation to meet the middle RET of
40%, or the highest RET of 75%.
As Table 4.6 shows, the Azores Islands case study involves very small electricity systems.
Hence, the limited amount of generation expansion required to meet the RETs.
In fact, even in the case where the RET is regional, Firm 2 still invests in renewable
energy when there is no REC market (Scenarios 1b and 3b). This is due to the fact that
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Table 4.6: Total renewable energy investment [MW] per scenario, across time periods.
Renewable RET - single goal RET - multiple goals
Investment [MW] REC market No REC market REC market No REC market
Regional 1a 0.38 1b 0.38 3a 0.38 3b 0.38
Firm-level 1c 0.39 1d 0.53 3c 0.39 3d 0.53
each firm has knowledge of the entire market demand, via the inverse demand curves. Thus,
both firms are strategically managing their own production and investments to meet demand
while keeping prices (and therefore profits) as high as possible. With the implementation
of an RET policy, renewable generation becomes the most valuable asset. In order to stay
competitive in the electricity market, Firm 2 must invest in renewable energy. It makes the
strategic decision that maximizes its profit, which results in a rather modest investment in
0.38 MW of biogas. The choice of biogas is also strategic, as this is the only renewable
energy generator that can operate to meet all demand levels - base, middle and peak.
Table 4.7 shows the total amount of RECs traded per scenario. Because Firm 2 must
invest in renewable energy to stay competitive, this necessity precludes the usefulness of
an REC market, under a regional RET policy (Scenarios 1a and 3a). Both firms produce
renewable energy to meet the regional RET, but there is no advantage to purchasing RECs
in order to meet the RET.
Table 4.7: Total renewable energy credits traded [MW] per scenario, across time periods.
RECs RET - single goal RET - multiple goals
Traded [MW] REC market No REC market REC market No REC market
Regional 1a 0 1b n/a 3a 0 3b n/a
Firm-level 1c 1,152 1d n/a 3c 4,115 3d n/a
When the RET policy is applied at the firm-level, however, REC purchasing becomes
attractive to the firm with fewer renewable energy assets (Firm 2). It sells its renewable
energy production in the electricity market because the prices are considerably higher than
the price of a renewable energy credit, even at a high RET. Because Firm 1 has sufficient
renewable energy assets to meet its own RETs, it seizes the opportunity to overproduce
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renewable energy and sell that overproduction as RECs to Firm 2.
An REC is only valued when an RET is being enforced. Table 4.8 shows how the price
of the credit, pRECt , changes with each RET and time period. As the target becomes more
stringent, the price of the REC increases.
Table 4.8: REC price [$/MWh] per scenario, per time period.
REC RET - single goal RET - multiple goals
Price [$/MWh] REC market No REC market REC market No REC market
Regional - 2015 1a 0 1b - 3a 7 3b -
2020 0 - 15 -
2025 38 - 38 -
Firm-level - 2015 1c 0 1d - 3c 11 3d -
2020 0 - 22 -
2025 38 - 38 -
Even though the price of the REC is lower than the wholesale electricity price, it does
not negate Firm 2’s need to invest in renewable energy in order to compete in the electricity
market at high RETs.
4.3.2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The price of an REC is never high enough to warrant renewable energy investment simply
for the purpose of participating in the renewable energy credit market. Thus, while the
presence of an REC market might facilitate small, fossil-fuel based firms in achieving a
firm-level RET, its existence does not encourage as much GHG reductions as an RET
policy. The total GHG emissions per scenario are shown in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Total greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) [tons] per scenario, across time periods.
Greenhouse Gas RET - single goal RET - multiple goals
Emissions [tons] REC market No REC market REC market No REC market
Regional 1a 26,078 1b 26,078 3a 23,032 3b 23,032
Firm-level 1c 26,070 1d 26,040 3c 22,988 3d 21,162
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Scenario 3d results in the lowest total GHG emissions because the multi-stage targets
require investment in, and production from, renewable energy earlier than any other sce-
nario. Due to the absence of an REC market, Firm 2 must meet the RET via its own
renewable energy production. This requires an increase in renewable energy investment,
compared to scenarios without a REC market. While the increased production from renew-
able energy generation contributes to a reduction in GHG emissions, its main cause is a
decrease in overall production (Table 4.10).
Table 4.10: Total electricity production [MW] per scenario, across time periods.
Total RET - single goal RET - multiple goals
Production [MW] REC market No REC market REC market No REC market
Regional 1a 42,970 1b 42,970 3a 42,898 3b 42,898
Firm-level 1c 42,937 1d 42,696 3c 42,800 3d 41,904
Table 4.10 shows how, as the RET policy becomes more restrictive by moving to firm-
level achievement and eliminating the REC market, total electricity production decreases.
This is a supply and demand issue. The RET policy mandates an increase in renewable
generation, which forces the producers to decrease generation from other technologies in
order to maintain high prices. As Table 4.11 shows, the more restrictive an RET policy, the
less profitable a firm with few renewable assets becomes.
Table 4.11: Total profits [$] per firm, per scenario, across time periods.
Total RET - single goal RET - multiple goals
Profits [$] REC market No REC market REC market No REC market
Regional Firm 1 1a 5,294,257 1b 5,294,257 3a 5,290,642 3b 5,290,642
Firm 2 4,752,461 4,752,461 4,721,452 4,721,452
Firm-level Firm 1 1c 5,291,751 1d 5,356,619 3c 5,337,060 3d 5,769,298
Firm 2 4,741,049 4,685,323 4,648,031 4,345,306
Firm 2’s profits are a case in point, as they are always decreasing with the increasing
stringency of a renewable energy policy. While this is also the case for Firm 1 under a
regional RET policy, a firm-level policy generally works in favor of the firm that already has
significant renewable energy assets. This is because, as described in Section 4.3.1, Firm 2
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must invest in renewable energy in order to stay competitive in the electricity market. It
makes the smallest investment necessary to meet the RET in order to minimize supply and
keep prices as high as possible. In Scenario 3d, because of the timing of the multi-stage
RETs, and the inability to meet them with credits, Firm 2 makes the strategic decision to
slightly decrease production. This minimizes the renewable investment needed to meet the
RET. Since consumers remain willing to pay for more electricity, Firm 1 is able to supplement
the load at node 2. Given this opportunity to over-produce and supply consumers at node
2, Firm 1 is able to maximize its profits under this RET policy.
4.3.3 Economic Efficiency of RET Policy
While the profits per firm may be decreasing, the most restrictive RET policy in terms
of goals and achievement mechanisms (Scenario 3d), actually results in the highest social
surplus (Table 4.12).
In Equation 4.32, the social surplus, or economic efficiency, is defined as the consumer
surplus, less the cost of investment and generation.
∑
fitb
βt−1Db
[
P 0itbsfitb −
P 0itb
2Q0itb
∑
g
(sgitb)2
]
− ∑
fihtb
βt−1DbCfihtxfihtb (4.32)
−∑
fiht
βt−1IfihKfiht
Table 4.12 shows that Scenario 3d maximizes social surplus. As discussed in Section
4.3.2, the most stringent RET policy (3d) results in the less efficient firm reducing its
production to meet the RET, so the remaining demand is met by the more efficient firm
with the larger renewable energy assets.
Not only does this policy result in the highest social surplus, it also results in the largest
reduction in GHG emissions (see Table 4.9).
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Table 4.12: Total social surplus [$] per scenario, across time periods.
Social RET - single goal RET - multiple goals
Surplus [$] REC market No REC market REC market No REC market
Regional 1a 10,046,718 1b 10,046,718 3a 10,012,093 3b 10,012,093
Firm-level 1c 10,046,702 1d 10,041,941 3c 10,025,655 3d 10,114,604
4.4 Conclusions
This study used complementarity modeling to investigate eight scenarios for renewable
energy target policy achievement. These scenarios apply to strategic generating firms with
the resource capacity to expand renewable energy generation. They can also transmit
electricity over a transmission network without congestion. The surest way to increase
renewable energy generation and reduce greenhouse gas emissions is to enforce a multi-stage
RET at the level of individual firms, and to eliminate the renewable energy credit market.
The increasingly stringent target stimulates early investment in renewable generation, and
its imposition on the firm-level forces individual agents to invest in low-carbon assets to
remain competitive in the electricity market. When an RET policy is set at the regional
level, a renewable energy credit market is never used to facilitate the target’s achievement.
Renewable energy investment occurs in all scenarios, as the imposition of an RET policy
requires firms with fewer renewable energy assets to invest in more renewable generation in
order to stay competitive in the electricity market. Our results show that the aforementioned
optimal policy formulation results in the highest social surplus, since the most efficient
investment in, and production of, renewable energy is achieved under this policy.
It is clear that renewable energy policy imposition is a fundamentally political affair, as
opposed to a mathematically optimal one. Albeit, policymakers could use the results of
studies like this to recognize that not all policies are equally efficient. In fact, this paper
is part of a nascent but growing literature that demonstrates how destructive interference
is possible, even among policies that are well-intentioned and, individually, theoretically
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favorable. Despite our model’s necessary simplification of extremely complicated market
dynamics, policymakers should investigate the renewable energy policy portfolio they wish
to implement carefully and holistically. In the case of electricity markets similar to the ones
modeled in this case study, for example, policymakers seeking to maximize social welfare
should consider implementing an increasingly stringent RET at the firm-level, and forego the
introduction of an REC market entirely. Our model does not account for REC transaction
costs, nor certificate verification, both of which would further decrease the social welfare.
There is much room for further research in this space. Future studies using this method
might investigate, for example, the optimal policy in cases where firms are fossil-fuel-
dependent and have limited capacity for renewable generation expansion. This would better
reflect the case of many electricity systems today. Moreover, it is worthwhile to explore
the optimal strategy in electricity systems with substantial transmission constraints, such
as the state of California. These are but two examples of future work we plan to undertake;
much additional work is needed to ensure that the political decisions being made about
renewable energy policies today rest on solid technical sound.
90
4.5. Addendum
4.5 Addendum
4.5.1 Future Work
Future work for this model involves broadening and extending the case study analysis to
one with constrained transmission and less renewable energy expansion options. Comparing
the results of this and the previous case study will allow for more generalizable policy
recommendations.
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Conclusions
The main conclusions from this thesis provide insights into renewable energy target (RET)
policy formulation. It is shown that the geographic attribution of an RET policy has a
significant effect on the local economic, social and environmental tradeoffs. For the case
study of the Azores Islands, Portugal, a regional geographic attribution of an RET results
in: generally, both the lowest cost and the lowest emissions on the archipelago, along with
a reasonably diverse distribution of renewable energy investments across the islands. It
is also shown that the optimal generation portfolio needed to meet an RET can change
dramatically from one RET percentage point to the next. Thus, setting an RET initially
too low could result in over-investment of certain renewable energy generation and possible
future unuse. It is strongly recommended that decision makers investigate the optimal
portfolio generation at the highest considerable RET, to avoid over-investment in renewable
generation that may be contrary to what is optimal for higher RET goals.
While one way of achieving a given RET policy is to directly invest in renewable en-
ergy generation, another achievement alternative for isolated systems such as islands, is
to interconnect to an area with greater renewable resources. In order to assess whether
interconnection is a better alternative than direct investment, consistent and accurate cost
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estimates for submarine power cable projects are needed. Using a global database of 61
submarine power cable projects across application areas, a well-performing model for prob-
abilistic cost prediction of submarine power cable projects was built. The utility of having
probabilistic cost predictions is demonstrated via a case study of submarine power cable
replacement to Vancouver Island, Canada. Uncertainty in decision making is further illus-
trated through the calculation of three different types of risk measures: 1) a probability; 2)
a quantile - the 90% Value-at-Risk (VaR); and 3) a tail expectation - the 90% Conditional
Value-at-Risk (CVaR). A probabilistic cost estimate gives the decision maker the ability
to assess investment decisions based on calculated risks. Accurate cost estimation is an
integral part of alternatives assessment, which, in turn, is integral to informed decision
making.
The final major alternative in RET achievement is through a renewable energy credit
(REC) market. When neither direct investment, nor interconnection are feasible or attrac-
tive, a firm faced with an RET obligation may choose to buy RECs to do so. Whether or
not an REC market is actually helpful in RET achievement was studied via complementarity
modeling of both the electricity market and the REC market. In an oligopolistic electricity
market, where firms have the ability to meet an RET either through direct investment or
by purchasing RECs in an REC market, small, fossil-fuel based firms will invest directly in
the minimum amount of renewable energy generation needed to stay competitive in the
electricity market. It is only when an RET policy is at the firm-level that REC markets
are utilized. In the case study of uncongested transmission, with the possibility to expand
renewable generation capacity, the RET policy the ensures the greatest decrease in green-
house gas emissions (GHG), while also incentivizing investment in renewable energy and
resulting in the highest economic efficiency of the eight policy scenarios studied. Thus, if
the main goal of a regulator is to maximize the traditional definition of social welfare, the
aforementioned RET policy may be the best, given the player and market circumstances of
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This thesis provides insights into RET policy formulation. While it is recognized that
the policymaking process is fundamentally political, the models developed in this thesis are
an attempt to ground the political discussion in technical analysis, and to move toward
evidence-based policymaking.
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Appendix A
Data, Generation Profiles and Costs
per Island
A.1 Portugal Data
Table A.1: Mainland Portugal data. Data used in Scenario 3 includes the mainland of Portugal, where generation capacity
and costs differ from the Azores Islands. Generation capacity data was gathered from the electricity system operator, REN
(Rede Elétrica Nacional) [10]. Maximum capacity expansion is assumed to be unlimited in almost any technology except
hydropower and biomass, which we assume can only expand to three times their current capacity. Capacity factor data on
mainland Portugal is from [11] for wind, [12] for hydropower and wave in mainland Portugal, and from [13] for all other
technologies. Cost data is from the Portuguese electric regulatory agency, [5], and the International Energy Agency (IEA) [7].
Annualized Costs
2008 Generating Capacity, C0gport Maximum Capacity Expansion, CMgport Capacity Expansion Integer, CEIgport Capacity Factor, CFgport Operating Cost, δgport Investment Cost, αgport
[MW] [MW] [MW] [%] [$/kWh] [$/kW]
Wind 2,757 50,000 2.30 21 0.0950 276
Offshore Wind - 50,000 2.30 30 0.0467 896
Hydropower 4,957 14,871 5.20 12 0.0920 339
Solar 50 50,000 0.29 15 0.3400 398
Wave 2 50,000 2.00 10 0.0819 1,138
Coal 1,776 50,000 298 65 0.0621 261
Diesel 1,877 50,000 16.0 70 0.0940 261
Natural Gas 2,166 50,000 9.00 45 0.0809 153
Biomass 1,463 4,389 34.0 45 0.0794 411
Table A.2: Demand and peak load in 2018. The annual demand for mainland Portugal, as well as annual peak load, using
forecasted growth values from [14][10].
Annual Demand and Peak Load
2018 Demand, Dport 2018 Peak Load, Plport
[MWh] [MW]
Portugal 55,000,000 10,757
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Table A.3: Annual load duration curve approximation. The percentages in the table below divide the annual load duration
curve into the amount of base, middle and peak load that must be met by the mainland Portuguese electricity system in 2018
[5].
Load Duration Curve Approximation
Ll [%]
Base 29.0
Middle 54.0
Peak 17.0
A.2 Results Scenario 1 - Isolated Generation Capacity
Expansion Investments
The first bar in the following graphs represent the existing generation capacity on the island.
At zero percent RET, no investments need to be made in renewable energy expansion.
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Figure A.1: Scenario 1 - Isolated Generation Capacity Expansions by Island. From left to right and down, the islands are
listed by increasing electricity demand. This figure shows how renewable energy investment changes by RET. Lumpiness is
at play in all cases.
A.3 Results Scenario 2 - Regional Generation Capacity
Expansion Investments
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Figure A.2: Scenario 2 - Regional Generation Capacity Expansions by Island. From left to right and down, the islands are
listed by increasing electricity demand. This figure shows how renewable energy investment changes by RET. The strategy of
RET setting becomes particularly important when the production of renewable energy from the entire archipelago can count
towards meeting the regional RET. Natural resource characteristics, lumpiness of turbine investment and differing costs can
cause the least-cost investment profile to change dramatically from one RET percentage point to the next. Long-term goals
should be considered carefully before the RET is set.
A.4 Results Scenario 3 - Country. Generation Capacity
Expansion Investments
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Figure A.3: Scenario 3 - Country : Generation Capacity Expansions by Island and mainland Portugal. From left to right and
down, the regions are listed by increasing electricity demand. This figure shows how renewable energy investment changes by
RET. When considering the broadest attribution of an RET, investment in local renewable energy still occurs.
A.5 Costs per Scenario, by Island
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Figure A.4: Costs per island, per scenario.
A.6 Cost savings as compared to Scenario 1 - Isolated,
by Island
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Figure A.5: Cost savings as compared to Scenario 1 - Isolated per island. There are three islands (Flores, São Jorge and
Terceira) where it may be cheaper to be in an isolated scneario, particulary at low RETs. In the case of São Miguel, with
large geothermal reserves, it always cheaper to have an isolated RET attribution. The cost to São Miguel of a regional or
country RET is more than compensated by the savings incurred on the other islands, as shown in Figure 2.5.
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Appendix B
Complementarity Model Specifications
Per Scenario
B.1 Mathematical specification of Scenarios
The model presented in Sections 4.2.1 - 4.2.4 represent Scenarios 1a and 3a: a regional
RET policy with the possibility of trading RECs. Modeling the six other scenarios described
in Table 4.2 require slight changes to the RET and REC market equations (Eqs. 4.6 - 4.13)
and corresponding KKT conditions of the complementarity model described in Sections
4.2.1 - 4.2.4. The necessary changes are enumerated in the following sections.
B.1.1 Regional-level RET without REC market: Scenarios 1b &
3b
In these two scenarios, a regional-level RET policy is put in place without the possibility of
trading RECs. This eliminates Eqs. 4.6 and 4.13 and the corresponding KKT conditions.
Further, the complementarity condition for primal variable xfihtb is updated to:
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0 ≤ xfihtb ⊥ βt−1Db (Cfiht − witb)− θftb + ρfihtb (B.1)
+ µfihtb +Db(δtRETt − δtREh) ≥ 0 ∀f, i, h, t, b
and Eq. 4.7 becomes:
∑
fihb
DbREhxfihtb ≥ RETt(
∑
fihb
Dbxfihtb) (δt) ∀t. (B.2)
As Eq. 4.7 is now an inequality, the dual variable complementarity condition must be
added as follows:
0 ≤ δt ⊥
∑
fihb
DbREhxfihtb −RETt(
∑
fihb
Dbxfihtb) ≥ 0 ∀t (B.3)
B.1.2 Firm-level RET with REC market: Scenarios 1c & 3c
Equation 4.6 remains the same. With the RET set for achievement at the firm-level, Eq.
4.7 becomes:
aft + rft ≥ RETft(
∑
ihb
Dbxfihtb) (ηft) ∀f, t (B.4)
Because Eq. 4.7 has been changed, the corresponding complementarity conditions (Eqs.
4.25 - 4.27) must also be updated:
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0 ≤ ηft ⊥ aft + rft −RETft(
∑
ihb
Dbxfihtb) ≥ 0 ∀f, t (B.5)
0 ≤ aft ⊥ −δft− ηft ≥ 0 ∀f, t (B.6)
0 ≤ rft ⊥ βt−1pRECt − ηft + pRECt ≥ 0 ∀f, t (B.7)
Finally, the complementarity condition for primal variable xfihtb must be updated to:
0 ≤ xfihtb ⊥ βt−1Db (Cfiht − witb)− θftb + ρfihtb (B.8)
+ µfihtb +Db(δftREh + ηftRETft) ≥ 0 ∀f, i, h, t, b
B.1.3 Firm-level RET without REC market: Scenarios 1d & 3d
In these two scenarios, a firm-level RET policy is put in place without the possibility of
trading RECs. This eliminates Eq. 4.6 and the corresponding KKT conditions. Further,
the complementarity condition for primal variable xfihtb is updated to:
0 ≤ xfihtb ⊥ βt−1Db (Cfiht − witb)− θftb + ρfihtb (B.9)
+ µfihtb +Db(δftRETft − δftREh) ≥ 0 ∀f, i, h, t, b
and Eq. 4.7 becomes:
∑
ihb
DbREhxfihtb ≥ RETft(
∑
ihb
Dbxfihtb) (δft) ∀f, t. (B.10)
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As Eq. 4.7 is now an inequality, the dual variable (δft) complementarity condition must
be added as follows:
0 ≤ δft ⊥
∑
ihb
DbREhxfihtb −RETft(
∑
ihb
Dbxfihtb) ≥ 0 ∀f, t (B.11)
B.1.4 Nodal Electricity Prices
Table B.1: Nodal Electricity Prices. Per Scenario, firm, time period and load type.
Electricity price [$/MWh]
Scenario 1a 1b 1c 1d 3a 3b 3c 3d
Firm 1 2015 Base 209 209 209 209 205 205 206 245
Middle 336 336 336 336 338 338 339 372
Peak 366 366 366 366 368 368 369 402
2020 Base 228 228 228 228 225 225 228 230
Middle 368 368 368 368 380 380 383 384
Peak 401 401 401 401 414 414 416 417
2025 Base 277 277 280 296 277 277 280 296
Middle 445 445 449 465 445 445 449 465
Peak 520 520 510 501 520 520 510 501
Firm 2 2015 Base 412 412 412 412 408 408 409 448
Middle 668 668 668 668 671 671 671 705
Peak 731 731 731 731 733 733 734 767
2020 Base 452 452 452 452 449 449 452 454
Middle 735 735 735 735 748 748 751 751
Peak 804 804 804 804 817 817 819 820
2025 Base 524 524 527 543 524 524 527 543
Middle 851 851 854 870 851 851 854 870
Peak 965 965 955 946 965 965 955 946
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